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ABSTRACT

Military Downsizing in the United States examines
military downsizing efforts during the late 1980's and
early 1990's.

It begins with an outline of the

historical development of the United States military,
and it then evaluates the key economic and political
factors involved in the recent decision to close bases
around the country.

Military Downsizing in the United

States then evaluates three separate base closure case
studies in California.

The case studies are Fort Ord,

the Long Beach Naval Complex, and Norton Air Force
Base.

The goal of these evaluations is to determine

whether interest group or elite politics is controlling
the base closure process.
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CHAPTER 1

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
MILITARY F R O M THE EARLY 1800's T O THE 1900’s.

INTRODUCTION
The United States military over the last two
hundred years has undergone considerable evolution.
Today, the United States possesses a large standing
military which is, for the most part, voluntary in its
nature.

The military is professional and officers

usually consider military office a career pathway.

In

addition, the United States military establishment is
oriented towards procuring high technology weapons for
the protection of the United States and its allies.

In

a word, the United States military today is a
thoroughly modern institution with the capability of
wielding its might anywhere around the globe.
The characteristics of today's military have made
the United States far more capable of directly
protecting its economic and military interests than
ever before.

However, the military preparedness of

the United States has come at a price.
1

Today, it is

2
more difficult than ever before for the United States
military to downsize its operations.

The inability to

downsize rapidly when necessary will cost the United
States taxpayers millions of dollars in the future; and
in many sectors of the military, there are individuals
and groups who wish to prevent downsizing for reasons
other than national security.

This reluctance to

downsize the military when necessary will create
serious threats to the budgetary process of the United
States government.
The politics of military downsizing was brought
back onto the nation's political agenda in the 1990's.
Included among many of the areas evaluated for military
downsizing were domestic military bases and facilities.
The topic of base closures will be the primary focus of
this discussion; but before addressing the politics of
base closure, it will be necessary to engage in a brief
historical review of how the United States military
became the budgetarily uncontrollable leviathan that it
is today.

PRE-COLD WAR HISTORY
Prior to the 180 0 's no professional armies existed
in Europe or the United States, but this all changed by
the 1900's.

The dramatic change in the military

3
occurred during the late 1700's and early 1800's.

It

was during this time that both the American and French
Revolutions occurred.

These new wars required the

mobilization of vast quantities of men, and these
large armies were difficult to control without an
experienced professional officer corps leading them.
The problem was that the armies of Europe and the
United States did not have trained officers, and they
knew that it would be naive to believe that a nation's
army would always have a military genius like Napoleon
to guide them.

Therefore, the armies of Europe and the

United States went about creating military academies to
train a professional officer corps for the military.
In the United States, a serious commitment to officer
education began at West Point in 1817 after the
difficulties of the War of 1812.
established an academy in 1845.

The Navy also
The end result was the

promoting of military officership as a viable career
choice for the first time in American history.1
Professionalization changed the face of the
military in another significant way.

For the first

time, the United States volunteer militia was not
considered the primary basis of American defense.

1-Allan R. Millet & Peter Maslowski, For the
Common Defense:
A Military History of the United
States of America (New York:
The Free Press, A
Division of Macmillan, Inc., 1994), p. 137.
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"Militia no longer figured in the commander in chief's
calculations... Professionalized regulars reinforced by
enthusiastic volunteers had replaced the common militia
as the foundation for national defense."2
By the late 1800's the United States had a
thoroughly well established professional officer corps,
but it still maintained small peacetime forces for the
Army and Navy.

Originally, these small forces were

deemed necessary only because the United States had to
protect its citizens from Indians and naval piracy.
However, by the last third of the 180 0 's officers
began to warn the government of the need to modernize
the military.

They argued that any possible enemies of

the United States were too strong for the American
military.

They pointed out that the lead time for

producing modern weaponry was far too long.

Finally

they believed warfare had become too complex for
amateur volunteer militias to master q u i c k l y .2
The United States military educated people about
the need for reform through their educational
facilities and through the writings of military
intellectuals.

One such military intellectual was

Emory Upton who wrote The Military Policy of the United

2 Ibid.
3Ibid., p. 271.

States after he conducted a world tour to review the
militaries of other nations in 1875.

He advocated the

adoption of German military methods for the United
States.

He criticized the United States for allowing

excessive civilian control of the Army, and he worried
about America's fascination with citizen-soldiers or
militia.

He also praised the Germans for engaging in

peacetime plans for war; maintaining a large standing
army; and for relying on a system of conscription.4
The Navy also had an intellectual reformer by the
name of Alfred Thayer Mahan.

He published The

Influence of Sea Power upon History,
1890.5

1660-1783 in

In his book, Mahan concluded that Britain had

achieved greatness by controlling the seas and the
commerce they bore.

He believed the United States

could imitate this greatness by establishing a strong
merchant marine, establishing colonies, and building a
large Navy with many battleships.5
By the late 1800's military intellectuals like

4Ibid., pp. 271-273.
^Donald M. Snow & Dennis M. Drew, From
Lexington to Desert Storm:
War and Politics in the
American Experience (Armonk, New York:
M.E. Sharpe,
Inc., 1994), p. 117.
^Allan R. Millet & Peter Maslowski, For the
Common Defense:
A Military Histor of the United States
of America
(New York:
The Free Press, A Division
of Macmillan, Inc., 1994), p. 275.

Mahan and Upton had established doctrines which would
be the basis of military arguments in favor of
expanding the size of both the Army and Navy.

While

the Army was still no match for any of the great
military powers of the world at the turn of the
century, the Navy was slowly becoming a world sea
power.

The United States Navy can credit new seacoast

emplacements, an expanding specialized industrial base,
and the writings of Mahan for its growth during this
ti m e .7
As can be seen, the establishment of military
academies and the writings of military intellectuals
played a key historical role in the development of a
large and professional military establishment in the
United States.

However, other historical events also

produced key attributes of today's military.

Two such

attributes were the reliance on high technology
weaponry and the maintenance of a large global
military presence.

Each of these attributes was first

established after World War II.

COLD WAR HISTORY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONTAINMENT AND
DETERRENCE POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES
As the power of Europe and Great Britain dwindled

7Ibid., p. 280.
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after World War II, the United States was forced to
assume the British role of being a global rival to the
Soviet Union.

As early as 1947 President Truman was

forced to confront the Soviet Union in both Greece and
Turkey.

He requested $400 million dollars to aid

Greece against a communist rebellion and Turkey against
Soviet pressures to revise the international convention
on control of the Straits.

In addition, Truman had to

fund governments in Western Europe in order to prevent
them from falling under communist rule, and he had to
oppose several third world revolutions which were
communistic in their leanings or sympathies.

The end

result of all this global crisis management would be
the establishment of the United States' containment and
deterrence policies by 1953.8
Deterrence against the Soviet Union meant the
nation would need a strong military to threaten the
Soviets, and they would have to use their military
establishment against the Soviets if it was felt that
their interests were threatened.

This deterent

included the recently discovered nuclear bomb, and it
also included collective security measures which had
been established through the Rio Pact and the United

8Ibid., pp. 496-498.

Nations.9
Initially, The Truman admininstration was almost
completely reliant on nuclear weaponry as the key to
its deterrence policy.

Ironically, the United States

was reliant on weaponry which its Strategic Air Command
(SAC) was incapable of delivering successfully to its
targets.

Apparently, the Air Force did not have a

single team capable of assembling a nuclear bomb until
1948, and in that same year. General Curtis E. LeMay
discovered that none of the Air F o r c e 1s thirty nuclear
bomber crews was capable of hitting its targets
accurately.

The reason Truman continued to rely on

nuclear weaponry was because the Finletter Commission
and various congressional committees had reported in
1948 that atomic weaponry and intercontinental delivery
systems would outstrip defensive systems for several
years to come.

These reports and the detonation of

the first Soviet nuclear device in 1949 gave Truman
good reason to approve the hydrogen bomb program in
1950.10
While Truman had begun to mobilize the United
States' nuclear forces in the right direction, he still
could not manage to convince the American people of the

9 Ibid., pp. 494-496.
10Ibid., pp. 499-501.

necessity to expand the nation's conventional forces
in order to contain Soviet military activity.

In 1949,

Truman managed to place the United States in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, a collective security
alliance.

This gave him a reason to increase the

United States' conventional f o r c e s . H

In June of 1950

the outbreak of the Korean Conflict also gave Truman a
reason to request increases in the size of American
conventional forces.*2
By the end of the Korean War, the administrations
of Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson began the process
of establishing a permanent containment and deterrence
policy.

Nuclear weapons were to remain the center

piece of this deterrence policy, and by 1965 the United
States had established a strategic nuclear triad of
intercontinental bombers, missiles, and submarines.
New collective defense organizations were established
around the world like ANZUS, and the United States
established a protective nuclear umbrella.13

13-Ibid., pp. 506-508.
12j0hn M. Carroll and Colin F. Baxter, ed., The
American Military Tradition:
From Colonial Times to
the Present (Wilmington, Delaware:
Scholarly Resources
Inc., 1993). p. 201.
l^Allan R. Millet & Peter Maslowski, For the
Common Defense:
A Military History of the United
States of America (New York:
The Free Press, A
Division of Macmillan, Inc., 1994), pp. 531-533.
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The large alliance systems and elaborate policies
of containment and deterrence help explain why the
United States has continually maintained a global
military presence.

However, United States military

history still has not revealed all the reasons why it
became so dependent on high technology.

To understand

this phenomenon more thoroughly, one must review the
administrations that followed Truman.
The Eisenhower administration proposed a "New
Look" policy for the United States military.
"Eisenhower believed that proxy wars like Korea and the
pressure of defense spending would fatally weaken the
American economy... "14

He pledged to reduce the

military budget by $14 billion in two years, and in
order to achieve his goal he chose to de-emphasis
conventional arms in favor of nuclear arms.
results were mixed.

The

He did lower budgets, but the

United States had to maintain an ability to wage a high
capacity nuclear strike in order to compensate for a
lack of conventional forces.15
The United States' defense became reliant on the
high technology involved in producing nuclear weapons.
In addition, the United States required intelligence on

14Ibid., p. 534.
15Ibid., pp. 534-535-
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Soviet military activity.

In the years following World

War II, the CIA relied on immigrants for some
information, but as the years went on there were fewer
immigrants.

Relying on British, French, and German spy

rings was not the answer to this problem since the
Soviets had already penetrated these spy networks.
Therefore, the only solutions available to the United
States were such high technology survelliance
operations as the U-2 spy plane and the National
Security Agency (NSA).1®
Finally, the Eisenhower administration further
encouraged the development of high technology by making
nuclear missile development a high priority in the late
1950's.

Ike was encouraged to do this because of the

Gaither Committee which recommended in 1957 that the
Strategic Air Command should not be alone in carrying
the burden of controlling America's nuclear arsenal.17
In addition,

it was during this time that the Soviets

launched "Sputnik" and proved that their missile
technology was becoming intercontinental.1®

16Ibid., pp. 536-537.
17Ibid.
1®John M. Carroll & Colin F. Baxter, e d . , The
American Military Tradition:
From Colonial Times to
the Present (Wilmington, Delaware:
Scholarly Resources
Inc., 1993), pp. 224-225.
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Eisenhower and the Soviets began engaging in a
race for technology.

It was a race which had been

sparked by Eisenhower's "doctrine of massive
retaliation" in 1954 and the Soviet's "Sputnik" launch
in 1957.
"Each combatant had to continually improve its
arsenal, so as to deter the other from using its
arms.
Fewer and fewer units of each successive
weapon were made, but each was much more
technically sophisticated than the last. A
process of institutionalized innovation was set
in motion.”19
This continual search for innovation meant a constant
rise in expenditures for research and development in
the defense budget, and technical innovation became the
primary goal of the military-industrial complex in the
United States.20
Innovation meant that defense budgets would have
to continue to increase during the Eisenhower
administration, but it was not innovation alone that
increased the defense budget during the Kennedy
administration.

Politics played a role in the

expansion of defense budgets during the Kennedy
presidency because he had to appear tough on military
issues to compensate for his Catholicism,

inexperience,

l^Ann Markusen et a l ., The Rise of the Gunbelt:
The Military Remapping of Industrial America (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 30.
2°lbid., p. 32.
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and relatively liberal views of containment policy.
The administration felt it could expand the defense
budget by $50 billion if it promised more
centralization and civilianization of defense decision
making.

Kennedy advocated a "flexible response" which

meant a buildup of conventional arms in order to insure
that the United States would not need to resort to
nuclear weapons prematurely during a hot war.
Kennedy's administration also argued for a "two and a
half war" conventional force which would be capable of
fighting in North Asia, Europe, and an insurgencythreatened state simultaneously.21
Kennedy's administration had the same misgivings
about extravagant defense expenditures as the
Eisenhower administration, and Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara tried to streamline the procurement
process for high technology weaponry.

However, the

Vietnam War and the military contraction during the
mid 1970's prevented this program from being
implemented successfully.22

2lAllan R. Millet & Peter Maslowski, For the
Common Defense:
A Military History of the United
States of America (New York:
The Free Press, A
Division of Macmillan, Inc., 1994), p. 558.
22Ann Markusen et a l ., The Rise of the Gunbelt:
The Military Remapping of Industrial America (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 30-31.
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During the late 1 9 7 0 's the United States lost a great
deal of control over the spending of its defense
budget.

The end result was a bloated defense budget

and a large national debt.

THE REAGAN MILITARY BUILDUP
From 1976 to 1980, American public opinion
drastically changed as the country began to feel that
not enough was being spent on national defense.

Carter

realized this and in 1979 he reacted by boycotting the
Moscow Olympics, placing a grain embargo on the
Soviets, and resuming draft registration.

These

actions were taken by Carter to gain political favor
with the American public during a presidential election
year.

However, the effort was too little, too late

since Reagan had already created a strong presidential
coalition based on a national security platform.23
Between the years of 1981 and 1989 the Reagan
presidency was responsible for the largest peacetime
military buildup in the history of the United States.
The Reagan coalition responded to what it and many in
the United States perceived as a deep decline in the
economic and military power of the United States during

23Daniel Wirls, Buildup:
The Politics of
Defense in the Reagan Era (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1992), pp. 27-28.
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the 1970's.

Reagan rejected the liberal foreign policy

of detente and instead opted for a "peace through
strength" position with the Soviets as an adversary.
To accomplish his military and economic goals, Reagan
cut taxes and domestic programs while increasing the
military budget.24
Upon Reagan1s arrival in the White House he began
to implement his economic policies which had the effect
of isolating Democrats from the debate on budget
expenditures in the United States government.

Reagan

had given the public big tax breaks, and he had cut
domestic programs.

As defense expenditures expanded,

it was politically infeasible for Democrats to argue
against larger defense expenditures.

It was also

infeasible for them to be for big tax increases.

In

effect, all the Democrats could do was watch as the
domestic programs they supported were cut to make way
for a bigger defense.25
During the early 1980's the United States was
suffering from a recession which the public expected
Reagan to fix.

Interestingly, Reagan's economic

philosophy prevented him from using the government to
boost the economy directly, but by supporting large

24ibid., pp. 1-2.
25ibid., pp. 2-3.
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investments in the military he was able to do this
indirectly during the recession of the early 1980's.
This military Keynesianism successfully bolstered the
economy during the recession, and it allowed the Reagan
administration to ask for more military expenditures.26
Military Keynesianism and the political isolation of
Democrats had the effect of institutionalizing the
annual defense expenditure increases of the 1980's.
Reagan's containment policy valued military
strength above everything else and it emphasized the
expansion of the military across the board.

Reagan's

containment policy assumed that wherever international
conflict occurred the Soviets somehow influenced it.
Of course, this policy of "peace through strength"
demanded that the United States confront the Soviet
threat wherever it was perceived, and this doctrine did
not limit military expenditures or rely heavily on
diplomacy as had the administrations of Eisenhower,
Nixon, and Carter.27
In military terms, the Reagan doctrine of "peace
through strength" meant the expansion of the Navy from
479 to 600 ships.

It meant that the Rapid Deployment

Force was changed from a force that borrowed troops and

26Ibid., pp. 46-48.
27Ibid., p. 32.

17
hardware from the different services to a force that
allowed for the addition of completely new troops and
equipment.

It also meant the development of more

conventional high technology weapons like the M-l
(tank), Bradley (fighting vehicle), DIVAD (air defense
system), and the Apache AH-64 (attack helicopter).
Certainly all of these programs had tactical
justifications for their existence.

Some were needed

for the new AirLand strategy in Europe, and others were
needed to defend the United States from a new "blue
water" Soviet Navy.

However, the emphasis of the

Reagan buildup was on Research & Development and
Procurement, not on operations or maintenance.
Therefore, the Reagan buildup was expected to be
expensive, but it is important to note that Reagan's
defense strategy which advocated qualitative not
quantitative superiority over the Soviets was not
atypical of previous administrations.2®

THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION
In March of 1991 the Secretary of Defense, Dick
Cheney, delivered a speech in which he described the
international events which had recently occurred in the
Soviet Union.

These international events, in

2®Ibid., pp. 41-44.
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combination with economic events domestically in the
United States, brought military downsizing back onto
the political agenda for the first time since 1979.
According to Secretary Cheney,
"The Warsaw Pact is dead as a military
organization and the threat of a short-warning,
global war starting in Europe is now less likely
than at any time in the last forty five years...
the Soviet ability to project conventional power
beyond its borders will continue to decline."
His speech was an acknowledgement by the Secretary of
Defense that the United States had won the Cold War.
His statement set the tone for future strategic
military planning in the United States.29
Secretary Cheney's evaluation of future threats to
the peace of the United States was not completely
positive.

He did point out that the Persian Gulf War

was the kind of future conflict that the United States
military could find itself being pulled into in the
future.

Some of the regions of the world where Cheney

felt a conflict like this could occur included the
Korean Peninsula, Middle East, and the Persian Gulf.
Cheney pointed out that future United States military
conflicts would probably be regional, occur with very
short notice, and involve well armed nations with

2^William W. Kaufmann and John D. Steinbruner,
Decisions for Defense:
Prospects for a New Order
(Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1991), p. 25.
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elements of conventional and unconventional

w e a p o n r y .

30

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with Dick Cheney
when they outlined five potential conflict scenarios
involving the United States' non-nuclear military
forces.

The first of these scenarios was "light"

insurgency or narcotics activity which could occur in
various locations.

The second was a "light" regional

contingency being needed in various unspecified
locations.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also believed a

"major" regional contingency could be needed against
North Korea in the future.

Another "major" regional

contingency could be needed in the Middle East, and
this was especially true of Iraq.

Finally, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff believed a "major" contingency might
be needed in Europe in the future to fight the still
"heavy" threat of Russian forces in the area.31

NEW MILITARY DOCTRINES AND CHANGING ECONOMIC
CIRCUMSTANCES FOR THE UNITED STATES IN THE 1990's
Based on such international changes. Secretary
Cheney began the task of drawing up a new military
strategy for the United States.

Interestingly, this

"new" strategy differed in very few significant ways

30ibid., p. 26.
31ibid.
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from the previous doctrines of containment and
deterrence.

Under the new strategy, strategic nuclear

forces will be maintained in order to facilitate a high
level of effective deterrence.

Second, strategic

forces will need to be structured in such a way that no
nation should feel pressured into conducting a
pre-emptive strike.

Finally, because United States

capabilities will need to be survivable in the event
that deterrence should fail, the strategic forces
should attempt to limit conflict to the lowest level
of violence possible.32
For conventional forces, Dick Cheney and the
Pentagon decided on a "two war strategy."

According to

this new doctrine, the United States military should be
capable of fighting two separate major conflicts
simultaneously, as outlined in the joint military net
assessment mentioned previously by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.

This doctrine means the United States should be

able to face a full scale war with North Korea and Iraq
simultaneously or face Russia and a large scale third
world conflict like the Persian Gulf War
simultaneously.33
It must be noted that in 1990 Dick Cheney reminded

32Ibid., p. 27.
33Ibid.
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Congress that all defense structure adjustments were
made possible by positive military trends in the Soviet
Union and the Third World.

He emphasized that recent

events indicated such positive assumptions may not be
completely well founded; and therefore, if events
change, the United States may have to slow down its
future budget downsizing efforts.
"Even so, he acknowledged that if, 'the Soviets
were to shift direction again and return to a
strategy of military confrontation it would take
them at least one or two years or longer to
regenerate the capability for a European
theater-wide offensive or global c o n f l i c t . 1 "34
Despite the end of the Cold War and efforts by
various groups to engage in military downsizing,
people like Secretary Cheney still seem to hold on
tightly to old values concerning defense budget
measures.

Cheney demonstrated a willingness to protect

operations and support budgets, and he also was willing
to streamline the process of weapons procurement.
However, Cheney still demonstrated a tendency for
favoring expensive next generation weapons which may
have limited utility in the future.

Examples of his

favoritism can be seen in his support for the B-2
stealth bomber, army ground-based stealth missile. Navy
& Air Force stealth fighters, and a hybrid C-17A for

34Ibid., pp. 27-28.
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military airlift capabilities.35
It seems from the descriptions of the new
international world order that the United States will
have very little opportunity to downsize its military,
and yet downsizing efforts have been made.

It stands

to reason that there must be motivational factors for
downsizing other than a decreasing Soviet military
threat around the world, such as the large budget
deficits produced during the Reagan buildup.
According to Senator Sam Nunn (D - Georgia),
"Secretary Cheney's orders to the services reflected
fiscal change, not a real threat

a s s e s s m e n t .

"36

jn

fact, revisions of the military budget were started
well before the threat of the Soviet Union was seen as
diminishing.

According to one defense administration

official, the revision of military budgets before the
revision of military strategy had wrecked "total chaos"
upon defense

p o l i c y .

37

By 1984, American public opinion experienced
another dramatic switch in its views concerning the size
of the United States military budget.

35lbid.,

In 1980,

pp. 52-53.

36Daniel Wirls, Buildup:
The Politics of
Defense in the Reagan Era (Ithaca:
Cornell University
Press, 1992), p. 218.
37ibid.
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Americans had felt that the United States was not
spending enough on the military budget, and in 1984,
Americans felt the government was spending too much on
a defense budget which needed to be lowered to pay off
growing budget deficits.

The dramatic change in

opinion did not affect Reagan's administration; but as
the Soviet Union fell, the Bush administration found
fewer justifiable reasons for maintaining a large
military budget.

The net result of this change in

public opinion will be a 1996 military budget which may
be equal to the purchasing level of the 1980 military
budget.38
The downsizing effort of the 1990's will be fairly
extensive, and it will involve all branches and
functions of the military.
in the following manner:

Personnel will be reduced
Active-duty personnel will go

from 2,070,000 to 1,653,000 by 1995; the National Guard
and Reserves will go from 1,128,000 to 906,000 by 1995;
and the civilian defense work force will go from
1,068,000 to 940,000 by 1995.

Strategic nuclear forces

will begin a modest downsizing effort due to the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

The Strategic

Defense Initiative (SDI) will be reduced to the Global
Protection Against Limited Strikes project or (GPALS).

38Ibid., pp. 220-222.
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This reduction will diminish SDI capabilities by half,
and it will reduce its cost to 80% of S D I 's original
cost.

Tactical nuclear weaponry will be reduced as

NATO begins removing all nuclear ordnances from Europe.
Finally, all of the services will be modernized, but
they will also face force cuts.39

THE CURRENT HISTORY BEHIND MILITARY BASE CLOSURES IN
THE UNITED STATES DURING THE 1990's
The Reagan fiscal programs of the 1980's left a
legacy of overspending and deficits which has forced
the United States government to engage in budgetary
downsizing.

One way to reduce the large size of the

military budget is by closing unnecessary military
bases around the country.

Certainly military bases

have been an acknowledged source of excessive military
waste and inefficiency, and the Defense Department
responded to this by forming the Commission on Base
Realignment and Closure.

The commission was first

suggested in 1984 by the Grace Commission which was the
President's Commission of Private Sector Survey on Cost
Control.

The Commission was implemented in 1988 by

39william W. Kaufmann and John D. Steinbruner,
Decisions for Defense:
Prospects for a New Order
(Washington D . C . : The Brookings Institution, 1991),
pp. 28-32.
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Defense Secretary Carlucci.40
The Commission on Base Realignment and Closure
faced the daunting task of addressing base closure
politics.

The United States government had not closed

a single base in the United States since 1977 because
of congressmen who had engaged in pork-barrel politics
and logrolling in order to prevent their districts from
losing military dollars.

In order to get around this

problem, the Grace Commission recommended a commission
with revised procedures.

The Commission was designed

by Secretary Carlucci as a bi-partisan board of
businessmen and retired military officers.

Together

this group submitted a list of 86 bases which needed to
be closed and 54 bases which ought to be realigned in
December of 1988.

However, the unique aspect of the

list was not found in the recommendations but rather in
the procedure for approval of the list.

According to

the procedures, the Secretary of Defense had to approve
or disapprove the whole list within 15 days.
Congress then had 45 days to do the same.

The

The goal was

to prevent Congress from making exceptions for each
base on the list.41

40Daniel Wirls, Buildup;
The Politics of
Defense in the Reagan Era (Ithaca:
Cornell University
Press, 1992), p. 212.
41Ibid., p. 213.

26
Initially, the suggestions and proceedings of the
Commission were only authorized by then Defense
Secretary Frank Carlucci.

However,

in October of 1988

the Commission was legally recognized in legislation
passed by Congress.42
The new regulations went a long way in forcing the
United States to face up to the need to downsize and
close inefficient military bases, but the United States
Congress did not allow the new commission's regulations
and procedures to prevent them from engaging in last
minute politicking.

Congress took all 45 days to act

on the Commission's recommendations, and many
congressmen threatened to strike the law down when
appropriation debates occurred during the next two
budget cycles.

Opposition to the list was bi-partisan

and included both liberals and conservatives.
Congresswomen like Nancy Pelosi (D - San Francisco) and
Barbara Boxer (D - California) argued that closing the
Presidio in San Francisco would cost more than keeping
it open.

Senator Alan Dixon of Illinois tried to get

copies of the transcripts of the Commission's
proceedings in order to use them to prevent bases from

42pefense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission.
Report to the President 1991 (Washington
D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 36.
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being closed in his state.4 ^

THE CURRENT PROGRESS OF MILITARY BASE CLOSURES DURING
THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Today, the Clinton Administration has continued
the base closures advocated by the Bush administration.
As recently as March of 1993 Secretary of Defense Les
Aspin advocated that 31 major military installations be
closed and that the United States scale back and
consolidate an additional 134.

In addition, 29

overseas military bases have also been slated for
closure by the administration of President Clinton.

In

a letter to congressmen on March 10, 1993, Aspin noted
that,

"Future changes will decrease force structure and

will require more, not fewer, base closures than those
I will recommend at this time."44
The politics of closing these bases will be made
all the more difficult because of the nature of the
modern United States military as outlined in this
chapter.

For example, the United States military has

been essentially an all volunteer force since 1974.

4^Daniel Wirls, Buildup:
The Politics of
Defense in the Reagan Era (Ithaca:
Cornell University
Press, 1992), p. 213.
4 4 "Aspin targets 31 military bases for closure;
cutbacks set at another 134 bases," Facts on F i l e , 18
March 1993 p. 185.
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According to Major Bill Crews,

"'You don't just have a

bunch of draftees who are eager to return to a world
they know...

In many cases, these career-military

persons have never had another job.'"45

in addition,

the sheer size and high technology orientation of the
United States military will make it difficult in the
future for military forces to simply be terminated
immediately upon request.

CONCLUSION
The goal of this paper will be to address the
politics behind closing military bases in a modern
military the size of the United States.

There are

several questions which need to be addressed.

Who is

in charge of the closing of military bases in the
United States?

Is it interest group politics or the

politics of the political elite which fuels the current
downsizing efforts?

Finally, how successful have these

efforts been in bringing about real change?
Chapter 2 will begin by addressing the primary
economic structures and economic forces responsible for
downsizing in the 199 0 's.

Chapters 3 thru 5 will then

endeavor to understand the politics behind base closing

45van Voorst Bruce, "You're out of the army
now," Tim e , 9 March 1992, p. 30.

by addressing three separate cases of military base
closing in the state of California in the early 1990'
Finally, the conclusion will take the knowledge
gathered from chapters 1 thru 5 and attempt to answer
the questions previously mentioned in this chapter.

CHAPTER 2

THE PRIMARY ECONOMIC STRUCTURES AND ECONOMIC
FORCES RESPONSIBLE FOR MILITARY BASE
CLOSURES IN THE 1990's

INTRODUCTION
The Reagan military buildup was economically
excessive, and few people in the Defense Department
would deny the fact that downsizing must occur.
However, as will be demonstrated,

in defense politics

it is always easier to create than to destroy.

Any

attempts to downsize the military must contend with the
political economics of the "iron triangle". Chapter two
will focus on the primary economic structures and
economic forces involved in the issue of military base
closings in the United States during the 1 9 9 0 's.
Therefore, this chapter must do three things.
it must discuss what the "iron triangle" is.

First,
Second,

this chapter has to display all the significant
political players involved in the "iron triangle".
Finally, it must relate these players and the "iron
triangle" to current base closing efforts.
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IRON TRIANGLES AND THE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL FIRM
An iron triangle,

"refers to a nexus of interest

and cooperation among a bureacratic agency, a
congressional committee, and some private interest,
usually in industry or business.

These triangles are

characterized as 'sub-governments' because they form
agenda-setting and decision-making units that exclude
broader participation. "

In defense, the role of the

bureaucratic agency is fulfilled by the following
political players:

the Department of Defense, the

National Aeronautical Space Administration, and the
nuclear weapons branch of the Department of Energy.
The Congressional role of the "iron triangle" is
fulfilled by the House & Senate Armed Services
Committees, the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee,
and the various congressional members of
defense-related districts and states.

Finally, the

private interest role is fulfilled by military firms,
labs, research institutes, trade associations, and
trade unions.2
There are many different types of "iron triangles"

^Daniel Wirls, Buildup:
The Politics of
Defense in the Reagan Era (Ithaca, New York:
Cornell
University Press, 1992), pp. 94-95.
^Gordon Adams, The Politics of Defense
Contracting:
The Iron Triangle (New York, New York:
Transaction Books, 1981), p. 24.
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in the United States government, and the best way to
demonstrate their effect is by showing how they alter
the behavior of military industrial firms.

Eventually

this example will be used to provide greater insight
into how "iron triangles" affect attempts at closing
bases across the country.

However, before proceeding,

certain myths about the "iron triangle"

must be

dispelled.
In Dismantling the Cold War Economy, Ann Markusen
and Joel Yudken present evidence from interviews which
demonstrate that the "iron triangle" of defense is not
quite as rigid and structured as people believe.

For

example, they found that neither the congressional
defense committee leadership nor congressional voting
patterns directly correlated with defense expenditures.
The authors cited two reasons why defense expenditures
were not directly controlled by key congressmen.

First

of all, the authors pointed out that Congress is not
the only key player in the defense game.

A project

reaches Congress only after years of gestation, and the
Pentagon usually has already determined who it wants to
do business with before Congress sees the funding
request.

They also pointed out that most people assume

that the majority of all defense expenditures go
directly towards the creation of new production
facilities.

In reality, most annual defense
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expenditures go to incremental projects, replacement
parts, or new & modified generations of equipment.
Generally, congressional porkbarreling only occurs when
a defense expenditure item is large.3

Therefore, the

"iron triangle" is a political mechanism which usually
only operates when the political stakes and economic
value of a project are high.
"Congressional configurations as well as
presidential preferences, do appear to be more
important in explaining military facility
location than the location of defense
manufacturing and service capacity.
The infamous
role of Sen. Lyndon Johnson in establishing
Houston's space center and Sen. John Stennis's
(D - Alabama) role in Huntsville's growing
arsenal are but a few of the many suspected
instances."4
However, even in the building of new bases
congressmen have much more control over preventing the
closing of bases in their districts than initiating the
opening of bases in their districts.

One reason for

this is the fact that a congressman's constituents
will hold him accountable for the closing of a base in
his district, but they will never hold him accountable
for not opening a base that does not yet exist.
Another reason why congressmen exercise more control
over base closing is the fact that maintaining funding

3Ann Markusen and Joel Yudken, Dismantling the
Cold War Economy (United States:
Harper Collins
Publishers, 1992), pp. 194-196.
4 Ibid., p. 196.
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in Congress is always easier than starting new funding.
According to United States Air Force General John
Herres:
"'the military is the dog that gets wagged by the
tail when it comes to base closings....
Operating base structure is expensive as hell.
You don't win wars with base structure, but with
weapons systems.
We always want to close more
than we can get away with.
But we always get
zinged by the political community.'"5
People can also be deceived into believing that
congressmen from military districts tend, by their
nature, to be pro-military.

Often people will assume

that their pro-military stance is the reason why the
district receives large amounts of military funding.
There is a simple explanation for why this is not
always the case.

People who are elected from a

military district will tend to have a pro-military bias
due to the local economy's dependence on defense
dollars.

They will naturally tend to want to be on key

defensive committees because of their constituents.

In

effect, pro-military congressmen do not always initiate
porkbarrel defense spending for their district because
many times the defense spending was initiated at the
request of the district before they came to Washington,
D.C.6

5Ibid., pp. 194-195.
6Ibid., p. 197.
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THE KEY COMPONENTS (POLITICAL PLAYERS) IN THE IRON
TRIANGLE
Clearly the "iron triangle" is not as rigid or
simplistic as the previous definition implied, and with
that in mind it is now time to analyze the various
components of the "iron triangle".

All three groups in

the "iron triangle" have something in common.

Each of

them is interested in how the military research and
development money is spent by the United States
government, but no one is more interested than the
military industrial firms.

In order to maintain

leadership roles in their field, defense contractors
are constantly engaging in research and development
operations.

These research and development operations

are what allow the corporations the ability to produce
the new weapons that the Pentagon is interested in.

A

large majority of all the research and development done
by corporations is funded by the government,

so it is

imperative to each corporation that it lobby the
government for m o n e y .^
In order to accomplish their goals, defense
contractors trade in two separate political commodities
(information & influence).

Contractors seek

^Gordon A d a m s , The Politics of Defense
Contracting;
The Iron Triangle (New York, New York:
Transaction Books, 1981), p. 96.
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information on future weapons programs; federal
procurement and regulations plans; how bureaucrats and
congressmen feel about a weapons project; and what
defense legislation will look like.

Government

relations officers and Washington staffers relay this
information to defense companies who use it to continue
preparations for production of future weapons systems.®
Government relations officers will also try to
help their companies gain influence in governmental
proceedings and decision-making.

Influence will allow

the company to have an edge over other companies in the
defense budget proceedings, and influence can be gained
in many different ways.

The company may try to

neutralize Congress, or sell the company's idea to
bureaucrats in the executive branch.

If these

strategies do not work, it may take its case to the
voters through grass-roots lobbying efforts and
campaign contributions.9
When lobbying,

it is important to remember that

lobbyists do not make distinctions between lobbying
Congress and the executive branch.

The Washington

staff will take the intiative at the legislative,
procurement, and appropriation levels.

®Ibid., p. 23.
9 Ibid., pp. 23-24.

Washington
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offices design the grass-roots efforts aimed at
employees, stockholders, and local communities.

They

also manage campaign contributions and direct contacts
with members of Congress.

Therefore, they are the

heart of all activity in the "iron triangle".10
The military industrial firms are the most active
instigators in the "iron triangle", and nowhere is this
more clearly seen than in the relationship between the
corporate Washington offices and the Congress.

Gordon

Adams engaged in a study of the political activity of
eight different major military industrial firms in the
late 1970's & early 1980's.

In three different stages

of the study he tried to determine how military firms
were utilizing their political action committee money.
In the first stage he matched the company plants
to congressional districts to see if certain
congressmen received campaign contributions because
their home district was a corporate district.

In the

second stage the author selected eight key
congressional committees that deal with the projects of
the Department of Defense and the National Aeronautical
Space Administration.

Amongst these committees were

the pivotal House and Senate Armed Services Committees
and the House and Senate Defense Appropriations

10Ibid., p. 130.

38
Subcommittees.

He then compared the membership of

congressmen to these committees with the amount of
campaign contributions that they received from military
contractors.11
Unfortunately, the campaign contributions from the
companies averaged only 28.4% in stage one and only 41%
in stage two.

These totals were certainly not the

percentage of campaign contributions that one would
expect to find in a strong "iron triangle" because over
half the money was still falling into non-military
congressional campaigns.

However, the final stage of

the study proved that there was a strong link between
the Congress and the companies.

In the final stage,

the author combined the previous two categories of
statistics and eliminated any double counting.

The

average percentage of contributions shot up to 59%. The
highest contributions came from McDonnell Douglas (78%)
and Lockheed (67%); and Northrop, Rockwell, and General
Dynamics also managed to spend over half of their
campaign contributions on key geographic and committee
candidates.I2
The political contributions made by military
corporations help congressmen stay in office, so

n Ibid., p. 116.
12Ibid., pp. 117.
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congressmen are naturally eager to listen to what
these military firms have to say.

Both groups need

each other politically, and therefore, they create a
bond which is extremely difficult to break.

However,

corporations are not the only groups that can help
congressmen stay in office.

Voters also have the

ability to establish an "iron triangle" bond with their
congressmen.
Dick Cheney,

As stated by former Defense Secretary
"If we leave base closing up to the

communities affected or to the members of Congress
affected, there won't be any bases closed.
to make these kinds of

d

e c

i

s

i

o

n

s

.

I get paid

jn effect, Cheney

is pointing out that an "iron triangle" bond between
the local communities and their congressmen exists.

It

uses votes instead of political contributions in order
to maintain the bond.
The bond between voter and congressman is not
necessarily beneficial to the common good, and it often
promotes only the self-interests of the local voters.
For example, in the first round of base closing
proposals that occurred in 1988, the Defense Base
Closure and Realignment Commission suggested 55
domestic military bases for closure.

The plan

collapsed under a hail of partisan recriminations in

13"Cheney Seeks to Close 31 Major Bases in
U.S.," Los Angeles Times, 13 April 1991, p. A 1 .
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Congress even though the United States desparately
needed to reduce the government deficit partially
created by excessive defense

e x p e n d i t u r e s . ^

The bond

between community voters and their congressional
representatives is part of the "iron triangle" that
prevents bases from being closed, and it is this "iron
triangle" which the discussion will focus on in
chapters three thru five.
However, the "iron triangle" example utilized to
describe the behavior of military-oriented corporations
has not been completely described as yet.

Thus far,

the example has taken only the behavior of the
corporations and Congress into consideration.

What

about the executive branch?
While campaign contributions and votes may explain
many of the reasons why Congress behaves the way it
does, these points still do not explain why the
executive branch would cooperate with corporations.
The answer can be found in the advisory committees and
personnel transfers of the Department of Defense.
Defense contractors often engage in lobbying
efforts through entities like defense advisory
committees.

The advisory committees serve as a vital

link between the executive branch and industrial firms.
14 Ibid., p. A24.

41
In 1979, the Department of Defense ranked sixth in the
total number of advisory committees in government, and
it ranked eleventh in the total number of members on
advisory committees (777).

The committees deal with a

wide range of issues of interest to both the Department
of Defense and military firms.

Among the most

important of these committees is the Defense Science
Board which is responsible for making decisions
concerning the valuable research and development funds
of the Pentagon.*5
In addition to their lobbying efforts,
corporations

have been known to offer tangible

benefits to individual employees of the executive
branch.

Retired men and women of the armed forces are

often hired by military firms for their knowledge of
government, aerospace technologies, and procurement
strategies.

Their expertise goes beyond general

knowledge of the process and extends into access to the
process.

In addition, companies often have a hand in

the choosing of key administrative officials in
defense.

From 1969 to 1973 it was noted that the top

100 defense contractors in the United States had hired
1,400 former employees of the Department of Defense,

l ^ G o r d o n
Adams, The Politics of Defense
Contracting:
The Iron Triangle (New York, New York:
Transaction Books, 1981), pp. 167-168.
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and 379 former employees of contractors became
employees of the Department of Defense during the same
time period.

The exchange of these employees between

military firms and the government can benefit the
firms' future business dealings with government and
give government a view of how contractors conduct
business.

The bond between business and the executive

branch also tends to exclude outsiders from the
political p r o c e s s . T h e r e f o r e ,

the executive branch

can form a bond of dependency with defense contractors
thru the offering of employment outside of the
government.
The defense department1s desire to maintain good
employment opportunities beyond their government
careers forces them to work cooperatively with military
contractors, and the executive branch's desire to
maintain employment also is an important factor in the
anti-base closing "iron triangle".

No defense

department employee is going to be willing to close
military bases if they feel that their job is going to
be eliminated in the process.

These employees are more

likely to join forces with their local community voters
and congressional representatives.

Together these

three political groups have one thing in common.

16Ibid., pp. 78-79.

They
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desire to maintain the flow of government money and
jobs into their district just like the military
corporations did in the previous example.
The "iron triangle" formed by local communities,
congressmen, and local military employees can be
devastatingly effective at thwarting any attempts at
closing down local military bases and facilities.
However, the local military "iron triangles" have been
relatively powerless against base closing efforts of
the early 1990's.

How is this possible?

Rep. Dick Armey (R - Texas) felt the only way to
break the local military "iron triangles" was to
eliminate their desire to cater to local parochialism.
He did this by conceiving the legislation responsible
for creating the Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission.

The eight member panel was to be composed

of non-congressional, unelected officials who would be
solely responsible for drawing up the list of bases
needing to be closed.

In effect, the commissioners

became the legislators of base closing, and they
eliminated the United States Congress from the local
military "iron triangles".

The local communities and

local military employees can threaten the commissioners
all they want, but their threats will be ineffective
because the commissioners are insulated from being
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voted into their positions.^
The question remains, however, why would
congressmen endorse the creation of a commission which
takes their legislative powers away from them?

The

answer to this question is that it provides a perfect
political cover for the Congress.

Congress knows that

it must cut defense budgets in the national interest of
the United States, but they can't simply ignore the
pain their local districts must sometimes endure for
the national interest.

The commission makes the tough

decisions as to who will lose their bases, and the
individual congressmen can be allowed to protest the
choice of their bases for closing.

Politically,

Congress loses responsibility for actions that they
themselves had begun by creating the commission in the
first place.
The previous chapter briefly discussed the
procedure utilized by the Commission to close bases,
but the procedure is much more detailed than this brief
summary may have implied.

Therefore, a more

substantial discussion of the role of the Department of
Defense in base closings is necessary.

This is

■^■^Neil Brown, "Base Closing Process Thwarts
Parochialism," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 10
July 1993, p. 1842.
18Ibid., p. 1842.
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especially true since a more in depth analysis of the
Defense Department's role will reveal how the Defense
Base Closure and Realignment Commission further
isolates local military employees from the
decision-making process occuring in the Department of
Defense.

THE ROLE OF THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT IN BASE CLOSURES
Two separate criteria were utilized in the
decision-making process.

The first of these criterian

used for determining which bases needed to be closed
was the force-structure plan submitted to Congress with
the Defense Department1s budget request for the year
the base closings were being advocated.

The second set

of criteria used to determine which bases needed to be
closed consisted of eight key points.

The first four

points concerned the military value of individual bases
and considered the following issues:

"current and

future mission requirements; availability and condition
of land facilities and air space; contingency and
mobilization requirements; and cost and manpower
implications."

The four remaining points concerning

individual bases considered the following issues:
"return on investment; local economic impact; impact on
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community infrastructure; and environmental impact.nl9
Together these two criteria placed distance
between both local communities & local military
employees and the Department of Defense.

Politically,

community leaders would be incapable of simply arguing
that closing a base would be harmful to a community.
The Defense Department would be capable of using its
two sets of criteria to find a defense against the
parochial arguments of communities.

Essentially, the

two criteria reduced political discussions of base
closing down to the level of military necessity.
Community economic needs virtually became a non-issue.
These two criteria were given to the three
branches of the armed forces, and each of them were
expected to create their own list of bases to be
closed.

Each of the armed services established a high

level commission to accomplish this goal.

They then

submitted their lists to the Secretary of Defense for
his approval.20

Therefore, the lists were prepared by

high level officials of the three branches of the armed
services and the Department of Defense.

None of these

officials were tied to local bases due to their

^ D e f e n s e Base Closure and Realignment Commission.
Report to the President 1991 (Washington D.C.:
U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 18.
20Ibid., pp. 18,21-22.
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positions in the bureaucracy, and local military
employees could expect very little assistance or mercy
from these officials.
In order to further guarantee that a base would
not be kept open for reasons other than military
necessity, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act
of 1990 placed a restriction upon the activities of the
Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

The

Commission is allowed to deviate from the list of base
closure recommendations it receives from the Secretary
of Defense only when they find "substantial deviations"
from the force-structure plan and selection criteria.21
Parochial politics are not allowed to blur the need to
close basing facilities, and no base is allowed to be
given preference over another unless the base can
justify its existence according to the two test
criteria.
One problem that could arise from this procedure
is that the armed services may initially "cheat" when
they produce their base closing lists.

The Defense

Base Closure and Realignment Act prevents this problem
by involving the General Accounting Office.

The

General Accounting Office is fully integrated into all

^ D e f e n s e Base Closure and Realignment
Commission.
Report to the President 1993 (Washington
D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 3-2.

48
review and analysis efforts during the production of
the list.

Each of the armed services was obligated to

have a General Accounting Officer placed on their base
closing commissions.

The General Accounting office

also verified the data produced by the armed services
for the Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission.22
The Commission's efforts were further shielded
from partisan politics by making all of their meetings
open to the public.

Community and congressional

leaders were allowed to offer testimony and viewpoints
concerning their local base facilities.23

on those

occasions where partisan politics played a role in the
choosing of a base the local leaders could come before
the Commission and lobby the board for its removal.
The Commission also allowed public testimony from
Department of Defense officials and other expert
witnesses.

Local leaders could not even complain about

the hearings being held exclusively in Washington D.C.
because they were held all over the

c o u n t r y .

24

22uefense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission.
Report to the President 1991 (Washington
D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 23.
23ibid., p. 12.
24Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission.
Report to the President 1993 (Washington
D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. vii.
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Finally, communities which will suffer base
closures are not going to be able to complain that the
economic pain of the closure will be absorbed only by
their community.

This parochial argument will not get

communities very far because the federal government is
obligated by law to help communities through this kind
of crisis with the help of the Economic Adjustment
Program.25
During the transition period which often lasts
between three and five years the communities will
receive help from the Defense Department in three w a y s .
First, the Department of Defense is obligated to
restore the environmental integrity of any polluted
military facility through the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
and the Defense Environmental Restoration Program.
Second, the Department of Defense is obligated to help
all civilian and military employees who are forced to
move due to a base closure.

The Defense Department

does this through the Homeowners Assistance Program
created in 1966.

Finally, the Department of Defenses'

Priority Placement Program and Displaced Employee
Program provide civilian employees assistance in

25uefense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission.
Report to the President 1991 (Washington
D . C . : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991) , p.74.
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finding a new job in defense or in other government
departments.26
These benefits lessen local community and military
employee anger at the base closing process, and
therefore, they further prevent local constituents from
activating the local military "iron triangle".
However, the success of actions taken by the Department
of Defense to eliminate local military "iron triangles"
can't be measured by what is written into law.

The

best measurement of success can only be determined by
the progress of military base closing in the 1990's.

THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE 1988 BASE CLOSURE ROUND AND
THE BASE CLOSURES THAT CAME AFTER 1988
Comparing the 1988 base closing round with the
rounds that followed it will demonstrate that the
current procedure for base closing is much more
effective at what it seeks to accomplish than were
previous procedures.

On May 3, 1988, Secretary of

Defense Frank Carlucci formed the Defense Secretary's
Commission on Base Realignment and Closure.

It studied

and recommended bases for realignment and closure.

By

October of 1988, the Congress had passed and President
Reagan had signed Public Law 100-526 which was known as
the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure

26Ibid., pp. 74-75.
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and Realignment Act.27
Unlike the 1988 Commission, the 1991 Commission
was established in law before the Commission was
established in reality.

The two commissions are very

different structurally.

For example, the 1988

Commission came up with its recommendations for base
closing and then reported its results to the secretary
of defense.
reverse

The 1991 Commission did this in the

o r d e r .

2^

in addition, Congress complained that

the hearings of the 1988 Commission had been closed and
secretive.

Congress also complained that many of the

threatened facilities had never been visited by the
commissioners, and faulty data had been used in order
to determine which bases ought to be closed and which
ought to be left

o p e n . 2 ^

As was noted previously in

this chapter, the 1991 Commission did not suffer from
these problems because of its reformed procedure.
As would be expected, many congressmen felt that
the first base closure list was highly partisan in its

27Ibid., p. 17.
^ D e f e n s e
Base Closure and Realignment
Commission.
Report to the President 1993 (Washington
D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993),
pp. 3-1 - 3-2.

^ D e f e n s e Base Closure and Realignment
Commission.
Report to the President 1991 (Washington
D . C . : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 19.
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choice of targets.

In noting the difference between

the 1989 list and the 1991 list, Rep. Les Aspin
(D - Wisconsin) stated,

"... a quick study indicated

the (1991) list is balanced between bases represented
by Democrats and Republicans.

By contrast, he said,

all but a handful of the 55 bases on last year's list
were located in areas represented by Democrats."30
As was noted previously in this chapter, the end
result of 198 9 's base closure list was a battle of
partisan politics in which the base closure list
collapsed from attacks in Congress.

In fact, after the

ordeal in Congress many of the bases on the 1989 list
had to be put on the 1991 list.31

The anger raised in

Congress over the 1989 list is exactly what the local
military "iron triangle" needs in order to prevent
bases from being closed.

The "iron triangle" finds it

very easy to gain support for its cause when the only
reason for certain bases being on a list is partisan
politics.

On the other hand, the "iron triangle" finds

it very difficult to gain support for its cause when
the reason for certain bases being on a list is their
military redundancy.
The current military base closure procedure forces

U.S.,"

30"Cheney Seeks to Close 31 Major Bases in
Los Angeles Times, 13 April 1991, p. A 2 4 .
31Ibid., p.A24.
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community leaders and congressmen to justify why their
base should be spared according to the bases actual
military value.

Initially, community leaders attempted

emotional pleas of economic hardship, but they found
that these pleas fell on deaf ears during the 1991
round of base closings.

In the most recent round of

base closings in 1993 community leaders came to terms
with the fact that bases were going to be closed.

The

only question left was whether or not their base was
going to be one of the bases to be closed.

The

community leaders1 only defense in these circumstances
was to prove that the armed services had underrated the
value of their

f a c i l i t y .

32

Apparently, the new procedures have created an
environment of frankness concerning which bases must be
closed.

It is no longer denied that some base

infrastructure is redundant.

However, politics still

does occur in the debate over whose base is most
redundant.

Chapters three thru five study the politics

of three different California facilities, and each of
these case studies will provide an illustration of how
downsizing occurs in the 1990's.

However, before

discussing these, one case study more thoroughly

•^Elizabeth A. Palmer, "Aspin Stands By
Original List As Panel Winds Up Work," Congressional
Quarterly Weekly Report 19 June 1993, p. 1593.
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demonstrates the "new" politics of base closing in the
United States than any other.

The case study shows how

even the most well armed community leaders can't
prevent the Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission from breaking through the "iron triangle".

CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA:
LOBBYING

A STUDY IN COMMUNITY

The city of Charleston, South Carolina was under
siege during the last round of base closings in 1993.
The United States Navy had proposed closing down the
naval complex in Charleston, and the closing of all six
parts of the complex would have cost the city 35,000
jobs.

In addition, the economic cost of lost wages was

estimated to be in the area of $1.1 billion dollars for
the

c i t y .

33

The Charleston Naval Complex was by far the
biggest cut the Commission threatened to make in any
community during the 1993 round.

Therefore, it stands

to reason that if the Commission is going to cave into
political interests this is one area in which they
mi g h t .

From the very beginning the base closing

procedure worked flawlessly.

Both of the Senators of

South Carolina were prevented from becoming too highly

33Elizabeth A. Palmer, "Fighting on the Home
Front Charleston Defends Itself," Congressional
Quarterly Weekly Report 8 May 1993, p. 1172.
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involved in the parochial interests of their
constituents.

In fact. Senators Strom Thurmond

(R - South Carolina) and Ernest F. Hoilings
(D - South Carolina) were each reduced to giving a one
minute speech before the Commission in defense of the
naval complex.34
However, the community of Charleston had far too
much at stake for them to simply accept the lose of the
naval complex.

The community leadership armed itself

with a $1 million war chest, and they hired Washington
lobbyists and public relations advisers to help them
lobby the Commissioners.35

Elizabeth Inabinet, the

President of the local chamber of commerce, was
responsible for hiring the Washington law firm, and it
was the local Chamber of Commerce that headed the
political battle against the Commission.

It

established the group called "In Defense of
Charleston".36
The goal of "In Defense of Charleston" was to
present the Charleston Naval Complex as the wrong

34ibid., p. 1172.
35"Panel Completes Recommendations On Closing
and Consolidating Bases," Washington Post, 28 June
1993, p. A 6 .
36Elizabeth A. Palmer, "Fighting on the Home
Front Charleston Defends Itself," Congressional
Quarterly Weekly Report 8 May 1993, p. 1172.
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shipyard to be closed.

They realized that the only way

they could convince the Commission to keep the naval
complex open was by presenting them with better
alternatives for base closings.

They decided to lobby

for the closing of the naval shipyard at Norfolk.
However, any lobbying effort needs to have more than a
good argument on its side.

A good lobbying effort

needs mon e y .37
"In Defense of Charleston" received money from
various government entities.

Republican Governor

Carroll A. Campbell Jr. transferred $500,000 from the
state to the campaign effort.

The cities of Charleston

and North Charleston each contributed $100,000 to the
lobbying effort.
$245,000.

The Chamber of Commerce contributed

Finally, shipyard workers and other

individuals throughout the community contributed
$50,000.38
Overall, the local military "iron triangle"
responded to the crisis as they had always responded
before.

They brought local community leaders together

with local military personnel and Washington lawmakers
and they produced a lobbying effort which might have
saved the complex under normal circumstances.

37Ibid., p. 1174.
38Ibid.

However,
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these were not normal circumstances.

The lawmakers

they were trying to influence were men and women who
were not elected, and thus, not afraid of angry voters.
In addition, they were lawmakers who had to close bases
whether local economies were prepared for the closures
or not.

In the end, the panel voted to close both the

Charleston Naval Shipyard and the Charleston Naval
Station.39

CONCLUSION
The Charleston case study demonstrates the amazing
effectiveness of the Commission in breaking the
"iron triangle" found in local military communities.
The Commission met in 1988,
base closure hearings.
1995.40

1991, and 1993 to engage in

Another round is scheduled for

The three case studies in the following

chapters will demonstrate the political actions taken
by each of the four rounds of base closings.

Some of

the facilities in the case studies were eliminated
early in the process, and others continue to gasp for
breath in the final rounds of closures in 1995.
All of the bases are in California.

The choice of

^ E l i z a b e t h A. Palmer, "Commission Delivers on
Promise Not To Be 'Rubber S t a m p 1," Congressional
Quarterly Weekly Report 26 June 1993, p. 1675.
^ D e f e n s e Base Closure and Realignment
Commission.
Report to the President 1993 (Washington
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 3-1.

this state as a geographical base for this discussion
is not coincidental.

In fact, it is one of the few

places which can convincingly lay a claim to having
been hurt more than the state of South Carolina.

The

California Institute is a bipartisan research group,
and it determined that the state of California had
suffered 60% of all the net personnel reductions in
the military during the first two base closing rounds
of 1988 and 1991.

To make matters worse, after all

the military personnel have been redistributed around
the country the state of California only seems to be
getting approximately one-third of its uprooted jobs
back.

Nationally, an average of two-thirds of all

uprooted military jobs come back to the states they
originated from.41

41" a Losing Battle," Los Angeles Times, 29 June
1993, p. A20.

CHAPTER 3

FORT ORD:

A CASE STUDY IN COOPERATION

INTRODUCTION
Fort Ord was established in Monterey in 1902
during the Spanish-American War.

Its main purpose was

to help evacuated troops recover from tropical diseases
which they had acquired during their tour of duty in
that conflict.

By 1933, Fort Ord was officially

established as a post in the Monterey Peninsula area,
and by 1991 the base had grown into an army facility
with over 15,000 military and 5,000 civilian personnel.
The base has served many different purposes over the
years.

During the Korean & Vietnam conflicts it was

a basic training camp, and in the 1970's it became an
infantry base.

The base has expanded over the years,

and today its facilities cover an area of over 28,000
acres.1
Over the last ten years the Pentagon has
considered the possibility of closing the base, but it

l"Fort Ord must shut down panel says," San Jose
Mercury News, 1 July 1991, (Newsbank Index, pp. INT
109:
F10 - 109:
F12.
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was not until November of 1989 that anyone seriously
threw out a base closure proposal for Fort Ord.

In

November of 1989, Army Chief of Staff, General Carl
Vuono suggested moving the 7th Division of Fort Ord to
Fort Lewis in Washington state.

The immediate result

of moving the 7th Light Infantry Division from Fort Ord
would be to leave the facility without a significant
mission, and thus, the base would have to close if the
suggestion was approved.2
Fort Ord has often been considered the "crown
jewel of army posts", and soldiers from the base have
served in every major American conflict since World War
I.

The facility certainly has a proud tradition, but

its closure by the army may save them a considerable
amount of money in the long run.

As of March 1992 the

United States army projected that the b a s e s ' closure
will save them between $150 million and $200 million
annually.^

As should be expected, such a high return

of savings should have produced a considerable amount
of interest in closing the base by both the Department
of Defense and the Base Closure and Realignment
Commission.

2 "Army may shut down Fort Ord," San Francisco
Examiner, 27 December 1989, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 139:
F5.
2David H. Hackworth, "Last Taps for Fort Ord,"
Newsweek, 9 March 1992, p. 38.
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In fact, Fort Ord was among the bases that was
suggested for closure in January 1990.

The suggestion

was part of a proposed package of base closures placed
in the Pentagon's 1991 budget blueprint.

However, this

list received a chilly reception from Congress because
of the severe economic impact it would have on local
communities.

In addition, the selection of bases

seemed to be overwhelmingly biased against Democratic
districts.

In the end, the list of base closures

revived the Base Closure and Realignment Commission of
1988 because Congress desired a fair evaluation of
bases before their suggestion for closure.

Congress

accomplished the Commission's revival through the
passage of legislation which gave the Commission legal
reinstatement.4
The chilly reception of Congress towards the 1990
base closure proposals saved Fort Ord from being closed
that year.

However, the reactivation of the Base

Closure and Realignment Commission meant that Fort
O r d ’s fate was only postponed to a date later in the
future.

On July 1, 1991, Chairman Jim Courter and his

Commission suggested the closure of several bases
throughout the state of California.

Amongst these

4"New Move to Close Fort Ord is Expected," Los
Angeles Times, 11 April 1991, p. A3.
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bases was Fort

O r d .

5

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE CLOSURE OF FORT ORD
However, before discussing what occurred during
the base closure process it is important to address the
reasons why the military felt Fort Ord was no longer
worthy of being kept open.

One of the reasons why the

military wanted to close Fort Ord was explained in a
December issue of the Armed Forces Journal.

The report

pointed out that the Army had too many light infantry
divisions.

It also pointed out that the light

infantry's mission of rapid deployment into hot spots
around the globe was in fact a mission that was in
conflict with the primary role of the Marine Corps.
Therefore, the 7th Division's move to Fort Lewis and
conversion from a light infantry unit to a heavy
infantry division with tanks would eliminate both
problems.®
Moving the 7th Division to Fort Lewis would solve
some of the problems associated with the 7th Division's
mission being limited to light infantry, but the

5"State Wins, Loses on Base Closings," Los
Angeles Times, 1 July 1991, p. A 1 .
6 " A r m y may shut down Fort Ord," San Francisco
Examiner, 27 December 1989, (Newsbank Index,
p. INT
139:
F 6 ).
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question still remains as to why the Army felt they
could not make the 7th Division conversion at Fort Ord?
The problem with a direct conversion at the Fort Ord
facility is that Fort Ord is simply too small for
anything other than a light infantry division.
Therefore, a second problem is that it is a single-use
base.

The United States Army has shown preference over

the years towards eliminating single-use bases in
exchange for larger multi-use bases.^
Another problem which contributed to the move to
close Fort Ord was the difficulties experienced by the
7th Division during the Panamanian invasion of 1989.
During that invasion the 7th Division experienced a
twenty-four hour delay in deploying to the theater of
conflict.

This delay was caused by two problems.

The

first problem was that Fort Ord had no military
airfield on base to deploy from.

The nearest military

airfield was located 150 miles away at Travis Air Force
Base.

The second problem was that the 7th Division was

plagued by fog which is a frequent occurrence at both
locations.®

Both problems hamper the abilities of the

7"Fort Ord must shut down, panel says," San
Jose Mercury New s , 1 July 1991, (Newsbank Index, p. INT
109: F l l ).
®"Army may shut down Fort Ord,11 San Francisco
Examiner, 27 December 1989, (Newsbank Index, p. INT
139: F 5 ).
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7th Division to deploy rapidly, and this is a problem
since rapid deployment is a necessary part of the
mission of a light infantry unit.
The Base Closing and Realignment Commission found
the need for the 7th Division to rapidly deploy not
quite as important as the Army had found it.

However,

they did point out in their report to the President
that the building of a new airfield or enhancement of
the old airfield would cost $97 million and might be
prevented by environmental concerns.

They also found

that moving the 7th Division to Fort Lewis would
optimize the use of that facility and nearby McChord
Air Force Base.9
The Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission also found two additional problems with Fort
Ord which helped motivate their decision to recommend
closing Fort Ord.

The first problem was the fact that

family housing at Fort Ord was limited and expensive.
According to the report, 1,365 families were
inadequately housed at the time of the publication of
the report.

The second problem was with the training

facilities for the 7th Division at Fort Ord and other
bases in the Monterey Bay area.

The report stated that

^Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission.
Report to the President 1991 (Washington
D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 36.
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training for the division was readily available in the
area, but the training of the division was divided
between three separate facilities:

Fort Ord, Fort

Hunter-Liggett, and Camp Roberts.10

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE CLOSURE OF FORT O R D O N THE
M O N T E R E Y PENINSULA
The closing of Fort Ord will be a mixed blessing
to the people of the Monterey Peninsula.

It provides

them with opportunities that most communities can only
dream of, and it provides them with challenges that
other communities can only hope they will never face.
For example, a full third of Monterey County's economy
is based on the activities occurring at Fort Ord;
however, the closing of Fort Ord will provide the
community with 28,057 acres of unused and partially
developed oceanfront property in an area well known for
its scenic beauty.

Monterey County Supervisor Sam P.

Karas had anticipated political fights over the
development of this land, and he planned on insisting
that Fort Ord be included for the first time in county
land-use plans when they came up for review in 1990.
Another state official also voiced Sam P. Karas'
when he stated,

10Ibid.

fears

"'I'll bet there are a lot of real
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estate people just licking their lips over this.

This

could well turn into a real battle royal. f" H
Losing a full third of its economy is going to be
difficult for the Monterey area to handle, but the
sheer size of the Fort Ord area may prevent a large
portion of the economic hit Monterey is going to face.
The Monterey County area currently is faced with a
housing shortage, and the Fort Ord land will provide
new areas for real estate developers to move into.

The

future rush to build would provide hundreds of new jobs
and residents to the area.12
The area will need plenty of new jobs and
residents according to a committee of county and local
officials who met in 1990.

They reported that the

closing of Fort Ord would mean a $277 million reduction
in the personal income of the region, and the base
closure would be directly responsible for a population
loss of 33,000 in the Monterey area.

Two cities in the

Monterey Peninsula will be particularly hard hit by the
base closures.

Charles McNeely, the city manager of

Seaside, California estimated that the city will lose
$40 million of its $120 million in annual retail sales.

"Folding the Fort," Los Angeles Times, 31
December 1989, p. A3.
12"Life after Fort Ord," San Jose Mercury N e w s ,
21 April 1991, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 66: G13).
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The city also expects to lose between 20% & 40% of its
40,000 citizens.

Mayor Johnson of Marina, California

anticipates losing 60% of Marina's 26,500 citizens.13
Another heavily hit institution in the Monterey
area will be the Monterey Peninsula Unified School
District.

The school district anticipates losing

one-third of its 15,000 pupils because their families
are employed by Fort Ord.

Another problem the school

district will have to deal with is the fact that six of
its schools are located on Fort Ord property.14
The economic statistics previously mentioned tend
to present the picture of a community soon to become a
ghost town, but this does not have to be the case.

As

mentioned previously, Monterey has 28,057 acres of
prime real estate ready to be developed, and a Pentagon
survey has demonstrated that in the last 100 domestic
base closings the majority of communities have been
better off economically five years after closure.

The

surveys have determined that of the 100 bases most
recently closed by the Department of Defense 42 have
become airports, 75 have become industrial and office
parks, and 12 have become four year universities.

13 "Towns around bases aghast," San Francisco
Examiner, 13 April 1991, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 67:
G 6 ).
14Ibid.

68
However, the happy results of these base closures were
not guaranteed, and some communities will deteriorate
if they do not make intelligent use of their
redevelopment opportunities.*5

THE IRON TRIANGLE OF MONTEREY: TURNING FAILURE INTO A
FIGHTING CHANCE FOR A PROSPEROUS FUTURE
Certainly, the Monterey area would not be expected
to simply allow such a heavy blow to be dealt to their
local economy without putting up a political fight to
keep the base open, and Rep. Leon Panetta
(D - Monterey) was one of the first congressmen to
spark life into the local military iron triangle.

Leon

Panetta was a highly influential member of the House
Budget Committee at the time of the Fort Ord base
closure process.

On December 31, 1989, he stated that

he would resist any attempts to close Fort Ord or to
move the 7th Infantry Division.

Panetta felt that

moving the 7th Infantry Division out of California was
a militarily unsound move.

He felt this was

particularly true since the division was expected to
move hundreds of miles north of its current location.
In his opinion. Fort Lewis could not offer the 7th
Infantry Division the same kind of year round good

15»Base Motives," Wall Street Journal, 3 July
1991, p. A 6 .
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weather that Fort Ord offers for training.

In

addition, Fort Lewis could not offer the division the
ability to conduct field maneuvers like Fort
Hunter-Liggett can at its 165,000 acre reserve near
Fort Ord.

Finally, Panetta pointed out that recent

expansions of on-post housing at the base made Fort Ord
among the best bases in the country for housing
military personnel.
Leon Panetta was not the only influential
California politician that attempted to come to the aid
of Fort Ord.

California Governor Pete Wilson told the

press that he was also against closing Fort Ord.
Senator John Seymour (R - California) also took a
strong stance against the closing of Fort Ord.

He

informed the press in April of 1991 that he intended to
conduct hearings into the procedures used by the
Department of Defense to justify their conclusion that
Fort Ord had to be closed.17
It is important to note the strategy used by the
Monterey iron triangle.

Local and national politicians

from the area chose a strategy that did not involve
high pressure tactics.

California's politicians chose

16"Folding the Fort," Los Angeles Ti m e s , 31
December 1989, p. A38.
"Town Foresee 'Devastation' if Ft. Ord Is
Shut," Los Angeles Times, 13 April 1991, p. A24.
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to challenge the Army's arguments for closing Fort Ord
directly based upon their merits.
strategy was a dramatic success.

In many ways their
The Defense Base

Closure and Realignment Commission agreed with many of
Fort Ord's supporters that many of the Army's arguments
for closing Fort Ord were less compelling than was
originally perceived.

One example was the argument

that Fort Ord could not deploy its troops quickly
enough.

Fort Ord's supporters convinced the Commission

that this argument by the Army was not persuasive
enough to close the base.

However, their strategy

failed to pass its most crucial test.

California's

politicians did convince the Commission that Fort Ord
was more useful than the Army believed, but they could
not convince the Commission that a different infantry
base deserved to be closed.

Therefore, the Commission

voted 6 to 1 to close Fort Ord by 1997.

Former

Secretary of the Army Howard "Bo" Callaway was the only
defender of the base, and he summarized the vote on
Fort Ord when he stated,

"This is the finest light

infantry base in the world, and we closed it for one
reason - to save $70 million a

y e a r . " 1^

The United States government broke the Monterey

18"port Ord must shut down, panel says," San
Jose Mercury N e w s , 1 July 1991, (Newsbank Index, p. INT
109:
F 1 0 ).
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iron triangle with the vote against Fort Ord by the
Commission.

The defeat was evident in the reactions by

two of Fort Ord's key supporters.

Senator John Seymour

told the press that he would appeal the Commission's
decision to President Bush.

If the Monterey iron

triangle had not been broken by the Commission's
actions it would not have been necessary for Senator
Seymour to resort to begging President Bush for mercy
in his state.

Rep. Leon Panetta took a different

approach to the problem.

He realized that the fight

for Fort Ord had been lost and that he was no longer
a position to prevent the base closure.

in

Therefore, he

told his local constituents that the community had to
accept the reality that Fort Ord was going to close and
to move on with their

lives.

The iron triangle was broken, but it did not
wither away and die.

Rep. Leon Panetta had delivered

the Fort's eulogy, but he did not simply leave Monterey
to deal with its new economic problems.

Panetta had

planned ahead, and he had formed a local committee
prior to the closure to deal with the possibility of
losing Fort Ord.

The committee's goals were to replace

civilian jobs, help businesses affected by the base
closure, provide health care to retired Army personnel,

19"state Wins, Loses on Base Closings," Los
Angeles Times, 1 July 1991, p. A21.

and develop plans for the redevelopment of the Fort Ord
r e s e r v a t i o n . i n effect, Leon Panetta had taken the
local military iron triangle's energy and redirected it
towards redevelopment of the area.

Rep. Leon Panetta

did not stop with producing a local committee to
address the problems created by the base closure.
also sponsored a bill before leaving Congress.

He

The

bill eventually became law, and it allowed the United
States military to turn over parts of a military
facility, a section at a time, once a section of the
base has been certified as having been free of
environmental contaminents.

This law is important to

the future of Fort Ord's redevelopment plans because
state environmental officials have already recommended
as many as 8,000 acres of the base be fenced off because
of unexploded munitions.21

THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF THE FORT ORD BASE CLOSURE
Rep. Leon Panetta's (D - Monterey) law is crucial
to the Fort Ord area because it is the only legislation
which will help them alleviate the problems of the

2 0 "Towns around bases aghast," San Francisco
Examiner, 13 April 1991, (Newsbank Indes, p. INT 67:
G 6 ).
21 "pollution threatens fast reuse of bases,"
San Jose Mercury New s , 22 March 1993, (Newsbank Index,
p.
INT 19: D 1 4 ).
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superfund law.

In 1980, the superfund law passed by

the United States Congress forced polluters to pay
fines to repair the environmental damage caused by
their actions.

The goal of the legislation was to

force the polluter to pay the bill for environmental
cleanups instead of the taxpayer.

An additional

stipulation of the law was that no portion of a
superfund site could be transferred or utilized until
all the contaminants were cleaned from the

a r e a .

22

The

second stipulation of the law would create serious
trouble for the Fort Ord area because the Environmental
Protection Agency has designated the Fort Ord facility
as a superfund site.

Cleaning the toxic sites around

the base could take up to 20 years, and the costs of
simply examining the problem could come to as much as
$3 million or $4 million dollars.22
According to the United States Army the Fort Ord
facility has 19 separate locations which will require
cleaning, and the cost for the operation is expected to
come to $60 million.

Many of the toxic sites on the

base are small and are fairly common to any area where

22Elizabeth A. Palmer, "Cleanup at Bases Slated
to Close Will Take Its Toll in Money and Time,"
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 7 March 1992, p.
548.
22 "Life after Fort Ord," San Jose Mercury New s ,
21 April, 1991, (Newsbank Index, p. 66:
G14).

a large population resides.
toxic sites includes:

For example, the list of

photo laboratories, a plastics

shop, three old sewage treatment facilities, and a
gasoline station.

However, other toxic sites on the

base are much more exotic.

For example, approximately

9,900 acres of the base have been littered with
explosives and ammunition.

Today those sites contain

high levels of lead and unexploded munitions, and the
Army discovered that these sites are threatening to
pollute the groundwater surrounding the base.

The

contamination of groundwater threatens the water supply
of 38,600 people and vast agricultural lands that use
the groundwater.24
Environmental problems like water contamination
are not issues which Monterey's local politicians can
choose to neglect.

Monterey is home to 15 separate

environmental groups which have in the past exercised
considerable power over the direction of development in
the community.

For example, the Pacific Union real

estate firm purchased 20,000 acres of land in Carmel
Valley for development, but the company was prevented
from building more than 360 homes and 140 hotel rooms
on the property because of the heightened environmental

24"port Ord cleanup a long haul," San Jose
Mercury N e w s , 30 April 1991, (Newsbank Index, p. INT
84: D 1 2 ).
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concerns of the citizens of Carmel Valley.25
Clearly, the various environmental groups of
Monterey will be opposed to the quick development of
Fort Ord, and their opposition to the idea will not
solely be based on the problems of water contamination
by military munitions.

The environmental groups will

also be concerned with the problems created by
endangered species of the area.

More than half of Fort

Ord's land provides vital habitat to endangered species
of the Monterey

P e n i n s u l a .

26

Another problem they will

be concerned with in the future is the problem of
unexploded munitions in the area.

According to the

Bureau of Land Management, the Fort Ord target range
will be permanently set aside as wildlife habitat, and
the United States Army will attempt to remove the
unexploded munitions from the area over the next 10
years.

A large portion of the unexploded munitions

will be recovered, and the land will help support
endangered species like Smith's butterfly and the
legless lizard.

Unfortunately, the technology for

recovering munitions is primative and expensive, and
the Army feels that some portions of the target range

25"Life after Fort Ord," San Jose Mercury N e w s ,
21 April 1991, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 66:
G14).
26"n o lack of visions for Army base," San Jose
Mercury N e w s , 31 January 1993, (Newsbank Index, p.
INT 10: B 8 ).
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will have to be kept off limits until better technology
allows them to recover the munitions.27

REDEVELOPMENT OF THE FORT ORD AREA
Even though the Fort Ord area has some severe
environmental problems the majority of the base is very
much ready to be received by the people of Monterey
County for redevelopment.

Unlike base closures of the

past the United States government has passed a law
allowing the Army to sell Fort Ord at the maximum
possible price available on the market.

The profit

from this real estate sale will be kept by the United
States Army.

The 1988 law allowing this procedure is

very different from previous Defense Department land
sales because previous sales gave top priority to other
government agencies.

The money generated from the

selling of Fort Ord is expected to generate $400
million from private and public interests, and the
profit motivation behind the land sale has several
Monterey officials worried.

The chairman of the

Monterey County Board of Supervisors, Sam Karas, voiced
his fears when he said the following:
"One of the things we're really concerned about

27"Explosives Left Behind Delay Military Base
Conversions," Los Angeles Times, 3 May 1994, p. A21.
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is, if the Defense Department is trying to derive
the most amount of revenue from it we might not
have the money to buy it...
Our fear is that it
will be sold to a private developer.
That's our
great fear.
Unless we have some protection, we
could have development out there that not
everyone could live w i t h . "28
Monterey officials knew they had to take unified
action if they wanted to prevent problems like
undesireable growth in the area.

Their solution was to

create a task force similar to the committee Rep. Leon
Panetta (D - Monterey) had produced for the community
during the base closure debate.

In the beginning, the

area consulted with over 380 different citizens from
business, government, environmental, and community
groups.

Eventually, this group consolidated into a

smaller group called the Fort Ord Reuse Group (FORG).
The people of Monterey have placed their hopes for an
orderly and successful redevelopment of Fort Ord in the
hands of FORG, but some individuals have feared that
the task force will not be able to accomplish its task
because it must maintain a shaky balancing act between
six different government bodies.

Each of the

government entities has a claim on Fort Ord's land, and
development of the property will only be able to
proceed if all the parties cooperate.

Most of the

region's citizens have continued to maintain a positive

28"Life after Fort Ord," San Jose Mercury N e w s ,
21 April 1991, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 66: G13).
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outlook on Fort Ord's development, but Josh
Kirschenbaum, a graduate student from the University of
California, Berkeley agrees that the pessimists have
good reason to fear the problems of a breakdown in
cooperation between the communties of Monterey.

He

studies city and regional planning and he pointed out
that if the bases' redevelopment is allowed to be
divided between the various communities then the
planning process will become a nightmare.29
For the most part the communities of Monterey have
cooperated with one another successfully, and there has
only been one hotly contested issue concerning the
development of Fort Ord.

The controversy concerns what

should be done with Fort Ord's four miles of beachfront
property and sand dunes.

Environmentalists, residents

of upscale communities, and some politicians in the
area want the property developed into a state park.

On

the other hand, communities like Marina, Seaside, and
Sand City feel the area should be zoned for resort
hotel development to help their economies recover from
the closing of Fort Ord.20

29"Life After Base Closures Often Turbulent,
Communities Find," Los Angeles Times, 12 April 1993,
(Newsbank Index, p. INT 28: B12).
20"impending Closure of Ft. Ord Draws Numerous
Pet Proiects," Los Angeles Times, 25 August 1991, p.
A 3 3 ).
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Suggestions for redeveloping the Fort Ord facility
vary widely and include ideas like:

the building of a

facility for the Internal Revenue Service, the building
of a military air base for the German government, and
the building of a new California state university.
However, none of the ideas suggested by developers has
sparked as much interest or unity of purpose as the
building of a new California state university.31
All the developments which will occur at Fort Ord
will require money, and the bill that Monterey has
asked the government to pay is extensive.

In January

of 1993, Monterey officials requested $4.8 million
dollars from the Pentagon's Office of Economic
Adjustment to fund the completion of the area's reuse
plan.

The amount of money is controversial because the

Office of Economic Adjustment has never awarded a
community more than $200,000.

Monterey officials also

requested $37 million worth of appropriations for Fort
Ord reuse from the Defense Department's budget, and
they requested $100 million worth of funds from the
Pentagon to help start the new University at the base.
Few politicians expect the area to receive all the

31Ibid.
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money they have formally requested.32
However, the area will receive at least $100
million to $135 million from the 1994 defense
appropriations budget to help create the new science
oriented California State University at Monterey Bay.
The money was diverted to Monterey by Rep. Leon Panetta
before he left to head the Office of Management and
Budget for President Clinton.

Initially, the

university was planned to have 2,000 students and
classes started in the fall of 1995.

Eventually the

campus will utilize 1,300 acres of the base, and it
will take advantage of nearly $1 billion worth of free
land, dormitories, athletic complexes, streets, sewers,
and theater complexes.

However, the new California

state university will not be alone among educational
institutions utilizing the land.

The University of

California, Santa Cruz will develop 850 acres of Fort
Ord for a technology center concerning computers,
scientific instrumentation, environmental protection,
and environmental restoration.

In addition, the

Defense Language Institute, Monterey Institute for
International Studies, and the Monterey College of Law

32»n o lack of visions for Army base," San Jose
Mercury News, 31 January 1993, (Newsbank Index, p. 10:
B8).
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will all relocate to Fort Ord in the future.33

ANALYSIS OF THE FORT O R D CASE STUDY
In analyzing the Fort Ord case study several questions
need to be asked.

The first of these questions is how

successful was the process behind closing Fort Ord?

In

the case of Fort Ord the political process behind the
base closing was highly successful because Monterey's
local iron triangle was broken by the Defense Base
Closure and Realignment Commission.

Proof of this fact

can be found in the actions of Monterey's top
officials.

Rep. Leon Panetta (D - Monterey), Senator

John Seymour (R - California), and Govenor Pete Wilson
of California all were opposed to the closing of Fort
Ord, but in each case they wielded little influence
over the final result of the Commission's decision.
This result is particularly surprising because of Leon
Panetta's strong influence over the House Budget
Committee.

Panetta had enough power to divert over

$100 million from the defense appropriations budget of
1994 to provide for the new California state university
in Monterey, and yet he did not have the power to
prevent the Commission from closing Fort Ord.

33csu waits as Fort Ord comes in from Cold
War," Sacramento B e e , 10 February 1993, (Newsbank Index,
p. INT 19: G 5 ).

The base closing process was also highly
successful in their case because of the reasons given
for closing Fort Ord.

According to reports and

testimony from the key officials involved in the
closing of Fort Ord, the base was as good as any other
facility in the Army, but the Commission's role is not
solely to determine which bases in America fulfill
their mission and which do not.

The Commission's

primary mission is to determine how to save the United
States money. In the end, the Commission agreed with
local officials, but they remembered their role and
they insisted on the closure despite political
pressure.
The second question this analysis needs to
consider is whether or not there were any unusual or
unique patterns of political behavior displayed in this
case study?

Three aspects of the political behavior in

this case study stand out.

The first aspect is that

the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission was
able to break the political influence of Monterey's
local iron triangle.

Certainly, this is a break from

previously established congressional traditions of
maintaining obsolete bases in congressional districts
in return for votes in future elections.

The second

unique aspect of this case study is that Monterey
officials did not attempt to promote strong grass-root
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support for keeping Fort Ord open.

Instead, high level

Monterey officials opted to fight their battle with a
low level of political pressure which failed to prevent
their base from being closed.

The third unique aspect

of this case is that the Monterey iron triangle was
used for purposes other than keeping Fort Ord open.

In

fact, Monterey's local iron triangle played a vital
role in the redevelopment process for the base after it
was marked for closure.
The third question which needs to be asked is
whether or not any good has come out of closing Fort
Ord?

One positive aspect of the closure is that it

will save the United States a great deal of money which
the government needs for paying the national debt.
However, curbing the nation's debt does not help the
local community which still has to deal with the
economic blow.

Fortunately, Monterey has accepted the

inevitability of Fort Ord being closed with optimism
and grace.

They opted to take their political energies

and place the majority of it into a redevelopment of
the area rather than wage a costly and probably futile
battle against the Commission.

Their political

initiative and the large size of Fort Ord have already
brought the beginning of a new university for the area.
The final question which needs to be asked is
whether or not anything bad has come out of closing
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Fort Ord?

The cooperation demonstrated by the

communities of Monterey during the planning of
Monterey's local university is not universal.

The

towns of Marina, Seaside, and Sand City want to develop
the Fort Ord coastline, and they will face a great deal
of resistance.

The key to successful development is

cooperation, and all parties concerned will have to
cooperate.

A lack of cooperation will lead to no one

being helped because development will simply freeze
along the coastline.
The only other problem which the Monterey Peninsula
faces because of the base closure is the severe
environmental degradation of certain portions of the
facility.

However, this is a problem which the

community would have to come to terms with whether the
base closed or remained open.

In addition, the problem

is not going to deal a serious blow to the area's
economy because approximately two-thirds of the land is
not contaminated.
Overall, the Monterey Peninsula will be badly hurt
by the closure in the beginning, but there is good
reason to believe that the area will eventually prosper
from the decision to close Fort Ord.

CHAPTER 4

LON G BEACH, CALIFORNIA: A CASE STUDY IN HIGH
STAKES A N D HIGH PRESSURE POLITICS

INTRODUCTION
The first naval activity to
California was in 1843.

In that

occur in Long Beach,
year the sloop of war

Gyane decided to drop its anchor in San Pedro Harbor,
and other ships soon followed.

In 1897, San Pedro

Harbor was visited by a full navy flotilla, and in
1908, the anchorage was used as a stop for Theodore
Roosevelt's great white fleet.

Inevitably, the navy

chose to make the harbor a permanent home
their operations, and the harbor

port for

received that

designation in 1919 when the United States Navy found
it necessary to divide their fleet into two separate
fleets (Pacific and Atlantic).

The base prospered for

many years until it was closed in 1950, but the base
closure was only temporary because the Korean War gave
a new justification for its existence.

The base was

closed again after the end of the Vietnam War in 1974,
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but again it was opened in 1979. 1
Over the years the base has had to overcome its
problem of being undervalued and overlooked by the
United States Navy.

The base has been repeatedly

closed throughout this century only to find its
facilities reopened by the Navy when the need was
apparent.

Additional evidence of this problem is seen

in the fact that the Long Beach naval facility was not
officially established as the headquarters of the
Pacific Fleet until 1942, but it had served in that
capacity since 1919.2

ip^e navy's first aircraft

carriers were stationed at this "quasi" headquarters of
the Pacific Fleet throughout the 1930's, and some of
the great historical battleships of World War II, like
the Arizona, were stationed in San Pedro Harbor before
they moved to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.3
Certainly, the people of the Long Beach area were
relieved when the facility was re-opened in 1979.

They

were relieved for many reasons, but the most important

l"Navy brass pulls up anchor," Long Beach Press
Telegram, 28 June 1994, (Newsbank Index, pp.
INT 35:
F12-F13).
2"A Final Salute For Naval Station," Los
Angeles Times, 1 October 1994, p. B 3 .
3 " 'Goodbye to a dear friend,'" Long Beach Press
Telegram, 1 October 1994, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 69:
C 1 2 ).
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reason was the fact that the Navy finally appeared to
appreciate the importance of the facility.

The Navy

spent $130 million on renovations to the base.

It

added a medical & dental clinic, fueling piers, a
barracks, and off-base housing for naval personnel.
The renovations seemed to signify that the Navy had
experienced a change of heart in regards to its Long
Beach naval facility.^
However, any assumptions that the Long Beach naval
facilities would have a long life were brought to an
abrupt end in the late 1980's.

The Long Beach Naval

Shipyard employs people like Arturo Ramos who was
president of the Federal Employees Metal Trades Council
during the late 1980's.

His group has had to fight off

three separate attempts to close the Long Beach Naval
Shipyards in the late 1980's and early 1990's.

The

workers and local boosters prevented the shipyards from
being placed on the 1988 base closure list which was a
list that was later accepted by the United States
Congress.

In 1989, the group was amongst the many

groups responsible for wrecking a second attempt to
close the shipyard and 53 other bases.

They had hoped

that these two attempts would be the last attempts at
closing the shipyards because the 347 acre facility was

4 "Navy brass pulls up anchor," Long Beach Press
Telegram, 28 June 1994, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 35:
F13).
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slowly becoming efficient and profitable, but the $10
million profit margin they had posted was not enough.
The shipyard was again being considered for placement
on the base closure list in 1991 along with its sister
facilities the Long Beach Naval Station and Hospital.®
The end result of the 1991 base closure list was
not encouraging to the Long Beach community.

The

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission decided
to close the Long Beach Naval Station, but it also
decided to keep the Long Beach Naval Shipyards open.
\

However, the Commission gave the Long Beach community
some additional bad news.

They suggested that the

naval shipyard's status be reevaluated in 1993.®

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE CLOSURES OF NAVAL FACILITIES IN
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA
Many factors contributed to the Navy's desire to
close Long Beach's naval facilities, and many of these
factors became apparent as early as the mid-1980's.
For example,

in 1985 the Long Beach Naval Shipyard

reduced its workforce by 13% or 900 employees.

The

reductions were only the beginning of a downsizing

5 "Politics blamed for plan to study closing the
site," Orange County Register , 1 June 1991, (Newsbank
Index, p. INT 97:
A6).
® "A Bittersweet Reprieve for Naval Workers,"
Los Angeles Times, 1 July 1991, p. A3.
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effort that was intended to reduce the facilities
workforce by 1,500 employees by the end of 1986.

The

layoffs in Long Beach were part of a nationwide
reduction in employment in the Navy due to a lack of
repair work for the nation's shipyards.7
The reduction in workforce at the shipyard hurt
the competitiveness of the Long Beach facility because
many highly skilled workers were removed at a time when
it needed to show it was an efficient facility.

A high

level of efficiency was needed not simply because of on
going reductions in the workforce, but also because the
shipyard had to compete against privately owned
shipyards for business in 1985.

Competition for ship

repair work is a relatively new procedure for the
United States Navy.8
However, the end result of the reduction of jobs
and the increased competition produced a shipyard that
was given a commendation for being the most efficient
government operated shipyard in the country in March
1991.9
However, greater efficiency at the naval shipyard

7 "Navy Trimming 900 Jobs at its Long Beach
Shipyard," Los Angeles Ti m e s , 22 November 1985, p. 3.
®Ibid., p. 4.
9 "A Bittersweet Reprieve for Naval Workers,"
Los Angeles Times, 1 July 1991, p. A20.
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did not remove the primary problem facing the Long
Beach facilities.

According to the Defense Base

Closure and Realignment Commission, the main problem
facing Long Beach was excess pier capacity on the west
coast.

This problem was particularly problematic for

the Long Beach Naval Station which had deficient
facilities and an inability to house the entire fleet
of Southern Californian naval ships.

On the other

hand, San Diego had the capability of housing all of
Southern California's naval vessels.*0

Therefore, San

Diego received support for keeping its naval station
open.
The Commission also decided to keep Everett,
Washington's naval station open because closing the
station would not remove enough of the excess pier
capacity in the west coast area.

The elimination of

these two candidates left only Long Beach which the
Commission believed would produce tremendous savings
for the government if it was closed.

Therefore, they

advocated closing the facility to reduce pier capacity
for the Pacific F l e e t . H
The politicians of Long Beach have had to fight an

^ D e f e n s e Base Closure and Realignment
Commission.
Report to the President 1991 (Washington
D.C . : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 49.
13-Ibid., pp. 49-50.
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uphill battle to keep the Long Beach naval facilities
open.

Clearly, the Long Beach Naval Shipyard, Station,

and Hospital are run efficiently, but it is undeniable
that the station and shipyard are too big.

Their large

size and excess capacity invites the elimination of
jobs and closing of facilities that they have
experienced over the last ten years.

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE CLOSURE OF N A V A L FACILITIES IN
LONG BEACH. CALIFORNIA
As previously mentioned, the 1991 base closure
list contained suggestions for closing all three naval
facilities in the city of Long Beach.

The combined

economic impact of possibly losing the shipyard,
station, and hospital was estimated at $3 billion in
1991.

The lose of revenue to the community was

particularly difficult since the city was currently
dealing with a local deficit of $26 million.12

Of the

$3 billion total the Long Beach Naval Station was worth
$1 billion to the local community in 1994, and the
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
guaranteed its closure in the 1991 round of base

12 "I11 Wind Blowing in Long Beach," Los Angeles
Times, 1 June 1991, p. B 1 .
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closures.13

Also in 1994, it was estimated that the

possible closing of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard would
mean the termination of 3,100 employees, and it is
estimated that the closure of that property would cost
the city's economy $750 million.14
The economic impact of the closings would not be
as severe to the local economy if it was not occurring
at a time when other industries were having difficulty
surviving in the area.

For example, the area's largest

local employer is McDonnell Douglas, and in 1991, they
announced plans to build a major new plant in a
different state.

The plant was going to create the

company's next generation of commercial jetliners, and
the decision to place the plant elsewhere may have cost
the community thousands of jobs.

In addition, the

troubled aircraft company transferred 3,200 jobs from
the Long Beach area during the same year.

Another

trouble spot for the local economy was the closing of
Buffums department store in Long Beach.

The locally

founded department store was a major contributor to the
city's weak retail sales tax base, but it recently went

1 ^ 111Goodbye to a dear friend,'"
Long Beach
Press Telegram, 1 October 1994, (Newsbank Index, p. INT
69: C12).
1 4 " S h i p y a r d
workers spread the word," Long
Beach Press Telegram, 23 November 1994, (Newsbank
Index, p. INT 84:
A14).
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bankrupt.

Today, the city receives retail sales tax

only from two shopping malls in the

a r e a .

15

The economic problems of Long Beach present a
challenge to local and national politicians who are
tied to the cities electorate.

It has often been the

case in the past that local politicians have used their
influence in order to maintain a strong economy in the
area.

For example, in 1983 the Long Beach Naval

Shipyards faced a cut of 800 employees from its
workforce.

All 800 were going to be laid off in the

following year due to a lack of naval overhaul and
repair jobs.

Many of the workers felt the lay offs

were being scheduled because the battleship New Jersey
was currently on duty in Lebanon instead of in port for
repairs.

During the lay off controversy then Secretary

of the Navy, John Lehman, announced plans to pull the
battleship Missouri out of moth balls and reactivate it
at Long Beach.

Rep. Daniel E. Lungren (R - Long Beach)

realized that the reactivation of the battleship could
prevent the lay offs at the shipyard, and he sent a
letter to Lehman requesting that he expedite the
project.

Rep. Daniel E. Lungren asked for the matter

to be expedited because the money earmarked in 1984 for
the reactivation of the battleship was only enough for

1 5 » m wind Blowing in Long Beach," Los Angeles
Times, 1 June 1991, p. B 3 .
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advanced planning to be done concerning the
reactivation of the Missouri.
There is nothing unusual about what Rep. Lungren
did for his local constituents.

He was simply

fulfilling his role in the local military iron
triangle, and his push to prevent the lay offs in his
district normally would win him the support of voters
in his district.

However, the Defense Base Closure and

Realignment Commission eliminated Congress from the
process as was noted in Chapter t w o .

Therefore R e p .

Lungren and his colleagues found it difficult to
prevent proposals to close various Long Beach
facilities during the Commission's reign.
When the Commission tried to close the naval
facilities, they were met by the full political
opposition of the Long Beach iron triangle, and unlike
Fort Ord, the people of Long Beach were not willing to
concede defeat at any point in the battle for their
facilities.

THE IRON TRIANGLE OF LON G BEACH.
SHIP

FIGHTING TO SAVE A SINKING

As was noted previously, the Long Beach shipyard
won a commendation for efficiency and innovation in

16»Navy to Lay Off 800 at Long Beach Yard," Los
Angeles Times, 19 November 1983, sec. 2, p. 7.
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management in March of 1991 because it had saved the
United States government over $80 million in the
previous four years.

Employees of the shipyard felt

that its efficient performance had saved the facility
even though they knew that the base closure commission
had already threatened to close the naval station and
hospital.

Their assumptions were wrong.

The addition

of the shipyard to the list along with the station and
hospital came as a shock to local politicians.

The

addition of the shipyard was not just shocking because
of the facilities recent efficiency rating.

It was

also surprising because local politicians thought they
had dissuaded Defense Secretary Dick Cheney from
placing the facility on the list in January through the
letter writing,

lobbying, and picketing activity that

city officials and workers had engaged in.17
The threatened lose of all three facilities moved
the entire community into action.

Politicians of the

area started to design their arguments opposing the
closing of the three facilities.

Senator Alan Cranston

(D - California), Rep. Dana Rohrabacher
(R - Long Beach), and Rep. Glenn M. Anderson
(D - Harbor City) all opposed the closing of the Long
Beach Naval Station.

Rohrabacher was particularly

1 7 » m wind Blowing in Long Beach,11 Los Angeles
Times, 1 June 1991, p. B 1 .
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critical of the methods used by the Navy to recommend
the closure of the station.

He pointed out that the

Navy's selection process had been criticized by the
General Accounting Office.

The selection process had

rated both the Long Beach station and the Pearl Harbor
station the same in four separate categories, and yet,
the Navy never advocated closing the Pearl Harbor
station.

According to Rohrabacher,

"'For all the Navy

can say about it, the yellow [closure] rating for Long
Beach might as well have been done by a coin flip.1"18
Local officials did not simply blame the Navy's
faulty analysis for their predicament.

Louis

Rodriguez, the president of Local 174 of the
Professional and Technical Engineers, felt that it was
not economics that brought the naval shipyard onto the
1991 list.

He felt that politics had a great deal to

do with Long Beach's appearance on the list.

Rep.

Glenn Anderson agreed with Louis Rodriguez's assesment
when he pointed out t h a t , "'In recent d a y s , the Long
Beach Naval Shipyard has come under attack by those
associated with Philadelphia as they try to replace
their shipyard with the best of them all.'"18

18"Legislators Seek to Save Ft. Ord, Long Beach
Base," Los Angeles Times, 22 May 1991, p. A3.
18"Politics blamed for plan to study closing
the site," Orange County Register, 1 June 1991,
(Newsbank Index, p. INT 97: A6).
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Long Beach assistant city manager John F. Shirley
also agreed when he said,

"'I don't think there is any

question Philadelphia has been able to assemble a large
coalition to defend their shipyard."20

Shirley listed

many prominent politicians whom he believed were a part
of the Philadelphia iron triangle.

He included the

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's
chairman who had represented the state of New Jersey in
Congress for 12 years.

He also included other

prominent politicians such as, House whip. Rep. William
Gray (D - Philadelphia); Senator Arlen Specter
(R - Pennsylvania); and Senator Bill Bradley
(R - New Jersey).

All these politicians were prominent

national figures and they were all concerned with the
welfare of Philadelphia and its shipyard.

Shirley's

primary concern was that the Philadelphia iron triangle
commanded more clout than the Long Beach iron triangle
which consists of Rep. Rohrabacher (a sophmore
representative); Rep. Anderson (recently removed from
his chairmanship of the House Public Works Committee);
Senator Seymour (a recently appointed Republican of
California); and Senator Cranston (a lame duck
Senator).

Shirley believed that only a united

delegation of Southern Californians would be able to

20Ibid.
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defeat Philadelphia, but unfortunately, Southern
California was divided over the Long Beach shipyard.25In the end. Long Beach officials realized that
their efforts to keep the Long Beach Naval Station open
were probably futile, and they placed most of their
efforts into preserving the Long Beach Naval Shipyard.
The Commission's elimination of the station meant the
removal of 29,000 enlisted personnel from the

a r e a .

22

The closure also meant that local officials had to
shift their efforts to insure that the shipyard was not
lost in the future.
One of the best ways to prevent a shipyard1s
closure is to produce enough business for the yard to
demonstrate that it is necessary to keep it open.

In

1992, California's senators and Los Angeles & Orange
County's representatives attempted to expand the
usefulness of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard by giving
it more business.

According to current naval

procedures, the Long Beach Naval Shipyard is allowed to
bid on large, long-term repair jobs, but it is not
allowed to bid on smaller repair jobs which are done
out of San Diego.

The limitation was put in place

because sailors stationed at San Diego could be forced

25-lbid. , pp.

INT 97:

A6-A7.

22 "a Bittersweet Reprieve for Naval Workers,"
Los Angeles Times, 1 July 1991, p. A20.
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to make a commute to Long Beach, and the commute could
place strains on the families of naval personnel.

Long

Beach politicians attempted to reverse this naval
procedure, and their goal was to allow the Long Beach
shipyard the ability to bid against San Diego's ship
repair facilities.

Rep. Duncan Hunter (R - Coronado)

discovered the attempt to "snatch" San Diego jobs, and
he placed a clause in the Defense Authorization Bill of
1992 banning Long Beach from taking such an action.
The bill and Hunter's clause passed in the House of
Representatives, but it was a struggle since two
separate attempts were made to thwart the progress of
the clause in

c o m m i t t e e .

23

Politicians of Long Beach were unsuccessful in
their attempt to produce a base that was so
commercially active that any attempt to close it would
be deemed foolish.

The 1993 round of base closings

found the Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission prepared to add the Long Beach Naval
Shipyard to its list once again.

Long Beach was

originally not placed on the list of base closures, but
the Commission placed it there as a possible
alternative to closing the Mare Island Shipyard of San
Francisco which was already on the list for

23»Battle Rages Over Ship Repair Maneuver," Los
Angeles Times, 17 June 1992, p. B 2 .
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consideration.24
The people of Long Beach began another extensive
round of lobbying efforts for the shipyard's future,
but the economic lobbying had little effect on the
final outcome of the Long Beach shipyard hearings.

The

Long Beach shipyard barely survived the hearing process
when the Commission voted four to three to keep the
base open.
vote.

There was some bad news attached to the

The bad news was that people expected the

shipyard facility to be a possible target for the 1995
round of base

c l o s u r e s .

25

one possible reason why the

base succeeded in staying open was the fact that the
Navy did not want the base closed originally.

The

United States Navy desired to keep the base open as an
emergency dry dock for aircraft carriers.

Another

possible reason for the shipyards success in avoiding a
closure order was the fact that the Commission was
already closing Mare Island shipyard in California
during the 1993 round of closures.

This position was

supported by Commissioner Harry C. McPherson Jr. who
stated,

"'Closing two public shipyards [in California]

2 4 "Long Beach Joins Bases Facing Possible
Closure," Los Angeles Times, 22 May 1993, p. A 1 .
25"Long Beach Navy Shipyard Spared," Los
Angeles Times, 26 June 1993, p. A 1 .
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is more than this commissioner wants to do in '93.'"26
However, as the vote points out the rest of the
Commission did not necessarily agree with McPherson's
position.

Commissioner Robert D. Stuart pointed out

that the Long Beach Naval Shipyard ought to be closed
even though it was not included in the base closure
list submitted to the Commission because the United
States Navy simply was not going to need Long Beach's
additional facilities as the Navy's fleet shrunk in
si z e .27
The sentiments expressed during the 1993 round of
base closures by Commissioner Stuart were heard by
local leaders in the Long Beach area, and they began
preparing for the possibility of their base being
reconsidered for closure in 1995.

People like the

president of the International Federation of
Professional and Technical Engineers, Louis Rodriguez,
began gathering signatures from people in the local
malls of the Long Beach area.

In a two day period

alone they managed to get 9,000 signatures protesting
the government's consideration of closing the shipyard.
The goal of the 1994 effort was to send the letters to
President Clinton when he received the base closure

26ibid.
27ibid.
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list from the Defense

Department for review.

It was

the hope of Rodriguez and other employees that Clinton
would see these letters and remove the shipyard from
consideration before the proposal was sent to the
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.28

On

February 28, 1995, their hopes of avoiding the 1995
round of base closures were ended when the Pentagon
released its list of recommendations for the
Commission.

Among the few outright base closures on

the list was the Long Beach Naval Shipyard.

The list

advocated more realignments than closures because of
Clinton's need to generate political support for his
re-election bid in states like

C a l i f o r n i a

.29

Another

reason for the advocacy of fewer closures was the fact
that the up-front costs of closing bases was beginning
to become expensive enough to prevent the immediate
closure of new

b a s e s .

20

REDEVELOPMENT OF THE L ONG BEACH AREA
Several of the Long Beach area's facilities have

2 8 11Shipyard workers spread the word, " Long
Beach Press Telegram, 23 November 1994, (Newsbank
Index, p. INT 84:
A14).
29»Base closure list to be short," Las Vegas
Review Journal, 26 February 1995, p. 1A.
30ibid., p. 2A.
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been closed by the Commission, and the Long Beach
community sees a logical need to redevelop the
properties in order to prevent economic hardship in
their community.

The need to engage in redevelopment

in the Long Beach area ran into a snag when the United
States Navy announced its intention to keep the
property of the Long Beach Naval Station and Hospital
after the two sites were closed.

The 1991 announcement

by the Navy forced Ernie Kell, the mayor of Long Beach,
to discuss the possibility of taking the property away
from the Navy based on legal grounds.
Kell,

According to

"We're going to have to take a look at how the

navy obtained the property (from the

c i t y ) .

"21

in

addition to the legal threats issued by the city of
Long Beach, the city also engaged in land negotiations
with the Navy in 1991.

The Navy, however, intends to

transfer the bulk of the naval station to the shipyards
which have not be ordered to close y e t .

The only

property which the city may be able to negotiate away
from the Navy is the hospital, three housing sites, and
the mole

p i e r .

22

Even the Los Alamitos golf courses located on the

21"Navy to hang on to L.B. base property," Long
Beach Press Telegram, 2 October 1991, (Newsbank Index,
p. INT 153: Gil ) .
22ibid., p. INT 153:

G12.
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naval station's property is being transferred to the
shipyard property.

The golf courses produce an annual

profit of $100,000 for the Navy which is used to fund
other naval recreational facilities in Long Beach like
the gymnasium and swimming pool.

This profit benefits

naval operations in the area, but the profit level is
nothing in comparison to the levels of profit the golf
courses could take in if they were privatized.

Joe

Guerra is the senior vice president of American Golf
Corporation of Santa Monica and he believes the naval
golf courses could be worth up to $5 or $10 million if
they were privatized.23
Over the last several years the United States Navy
has steadfastly maintained its hold over the majority
of its Long Beach property, but the city of Long Beach
has not been content to allow their land negotiations
to go to waste.

On June 28, 1994 the city produced a

land development proposal for the Long Beach Naval
Station which was presented to the United States Navy.
The land development proposal was endorsed by the city,
and the plan included a proposal to bulldoze the base
and convert 100 acres of the property into a container
terminal.

The Navy decided to consider the proposals,

23»Navy to Keep Beachhead on Golf Links After
Long Beach Pullout," Los Anqeles Times, 12 September
1991, p. A3.
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but in exchange, the Navy intends to ask the city of
Long Beach to fund the renovation of a barracks,
medical clinic, and exchange & commissary at the
shipyard.24

ANALYSIS OF THE LONG BEACH CASE STUDY
The best way to analyze the Long Beach case study
is by utilizing the same four questions used in the
previous Fort Ord case study.

The answers to the

questions will allow both case studies to be more
readily compared with one another.
The first question which needs to be asked is how
successful was the process behind the closing of the
Long Beach Naval shipyard, station, and hospital?
Overall, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission's efforts should be labeled successful, but
they did have some difficulties.

Both the closing of

the naval station and the hospital were done with
relatively little difficulty, but the closing of the
naval shipyard still has not occurred even though the
Navy will not need the facility as the fleet shrinks in
size.

However, the survival of the shipyard can not

truly be attributed to anything special done by the

34*Navy brass pulls up anchor," Long Beach
Press Telegram, 28 June 1994, (Newsbank Index, p. INT
35:
F 1 2 ).
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Long Beach iron triangle, and this was especially true
during the 1993 round of base closings.

It was during

that round of base closings that the Commission was
afraid

that closing more than one shipyard in

California would be too much.

The lack of resolve

shown by the Commission in 1993 was a shortcoming of
the Commission's otherwise fair and effective
proceedings, but it was a shortcoming which the
Commission corrected when it placed the shipyard on the
1995 list of recommendations for base closures.
While the Commission's resolve was occasionally
tested during the hearings concerning the shipyards it
was never tested with the station and hospital.

In

both the case of the hospital and the station the
Commission weighed the evidence for and against closing
each and decided to close each because they were
unnecessary facilities that were costing the government
too much to keep open.
The second question of this analysis concerns
whether or not there were any unusual or unique
patterns of political behavior displayed in the Long
Beach case study?
stand out.

Three aspects of the case study

The first unique aspect of this case study

is that, like the Fort Ord case, the local military
iron triangle was broken by the Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission.

However, unlike the

previous case study the Long Beach iron triangle
initially did make some progress in opposition to the
Commission.

A second interesting aspect of this case

study was the angry tone of the political discussion
set by the Long Beach iron triangle during the
hearings.

The angry and highly political tone is not

necessarily unique to other battles waged by local
military iron triangles, but it serves as an
interesting contrast to the more subdued approach taken
by the Fort Ord iron triangle.

The contrasting tactics

are particularly interesting because they demonstrate
that neither tactic guarantees success against the
Commission.

The third interesting aspect of the case

study was that the iron triangle of Long Beach did
display a genuine concern about redevelopment of the
closed bases.

The concern was less well pronounced

than in the Fort Ord case, but nevertheless, the iron
triangle did alter its mission (keeping bases open)
somewhat when it became involved in the redevelopment
of the naval station.
The third question of this analysis is whether or
not any good has come out of closing the Long Beach
naval complex?

Unfortunately, the only one who seem to

be benefitting from the various facility closures in
Long Beach is the United States government.

The

closure of the Long Beach naval facilities will allow
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the United States government to save a considerable
amount of money as time goes on, but the base closure
will hurt the local governments of the Long Beach area.
They will be hurt initially by the closing of the
bases, but their biggest problem in the long term may
be getting the United States Navy to release the
property for redevelopment.
Finally, the fourth question is whether or not
anything bad has come because of the closing of the
Long Beach naval facilities?

Long Beach may have made

a bad situation worse by opposing the Commission's
wishes for so long, and the Commission may not have
been doing the people of Long Beach any favors by
allowing the naval shipyards to stay open beyond the
1993 round of base closures.

The community fight with

the Commission has continued on with only a little
attention being given to the redevelopment of the
facilities.

The length of the battle with the

Commission has also put them in a position in which
they will be one of the last communities to ask the
government for assistance in their redevelopment
proposals.

It is conceivable that they will be given

very little aid because other communities came before
them.
Overall, the chances for productive redevelopment
of the Long Beach facility look fairly unfavorable in

the near future, and the primary culprits are the
volatile Long Beach iron triangle and the overly
compassionate Commission.

The combination of hostility

and compassion has only postponed the inevitable
closure of the Long Beach facilities, and if the Long
Beach community finds that they have lost the shipyard
after the 1995 round of base closures they will have
done little to prepare for a future without the bases.

CHAPTER 5

NORTON AIR FORCE BASE:
A CASE STUDY IN LOCAL
GREED, JEALOUSY, AND UNCOOPERATIVENESS

INTRODUCTION
Norton Air Force Base is located in San Bernadino,
California, and in 1988, the base employed a total of
4,500 military and 2,133 civilian employees.

The Air

Force base was the home of the 63rd Military Airlift
Wing, and it also was where other air wings like the
445th military airlift wing were stationed.

The

airlift wings allow the base to maintain airlift
capability for air and ground forces, and the base can
deliver these forces expeditiously to anywhere in the
world.

In addition to the bases' airlift capabilities,

it also served as a headquarters for the Air Force
Inspection and Safety Center, the Ballistic Missile
Office, and the United States Air Force Audit Agency.1
The 53rd Airlift Squadron was amongst the
different air wings which served at Norton Air Force

1"Presidio Among 6 in California on Target
List," Los Angeles Times, 30 December 1988, (Newsbank
Index, p. INT 165:
D9).
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Base, and like many other airwings at the base they
have been in every conceivable type of military mission
requiring airlift capabilities.

In 1942, the 53rd

Airlift Squadron dropped paratroopers over Sicily from
C-47's, and they delivered 8,500 gallons of gasoline to
General George Patton's troops in Frankfurt, Germany.
They have also seen military action in places like
Korea and Da Nang, but the airlift squadron was not
limited just to flights over combat zones.

The

squadron also served in humanitarian efforts like the
Berlin airlift, and they have served in relief efforts
during domestic disasters like hurricanes in Florida
and the emergency cleanup of Three Mile Island.

The

various airlift wings of Norton Air Force Base are
vital to the proper functioning of military plans, but
they are not the first image that pops into mind when
one thinks about the Air Force.

Colonel John D. Hopper

Jr. admitted as much when he said,

"'The more glamorous

missions belong to the shooters who drop the bombs and
shoot the g u n s .'"2
Norton Air Force Base has seen a great deal of
activity over the years, but nothing in its history
compares to the amount of activity during the Vietnam
War.

Lieutenant Colonel Lynn Nelson described Norton

^"Final Fliqht," Los Anqeles Times, 30 April
1993, p. A3.
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Air Force Base during the Vietnam War as a "virtual sky
highway" connecting the United States to Southeast Asia
and Vietnam.

However, the high level of activity

during the Vietnam War subsided quickly with the ending
of hostilities, and the base was scheduled for closure
in the 1970's.

The base was not closed then because

the entire list of proposed base closures was
terminated, and it was not until late 1988 that
Norton's personnel started to hear rumors of a new
effort to close the facility.^
Initially, the communities surrounding Norton
prepared to battle the United States government to
preserve the existence of their base, but unlike the
other previously mentioned base closure case studies,
the San Bernadino community offered very little actual
resistance to the government's plans to close the base.
The Presidential Commission recommended closing Norton
Air Force Base in December of 1988, and by January of
1989 the county, cities, and community leaders of the
area had formed the Norton Economic Expansion
Committee.

The mission of the committee was to oppose

any attempt to close Norton and to prepare the
community for redevelopment of the area if the

^"The Last Waltz at 86 Military Bases,"
Insight/Washington Times, 9 October 1989, (Newsbank
Index, p. INT 113:
Cll).
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committee failed in its efforts.

After only four

months of struggling against the federal government the
communities surrounding Norton Air Force Base realized
that the closure of their base was inevitable.

Between

April and June of 1989 the committee began to address
various ideas on how the property could be

r e u s e d . ^

The plan to close Norton was approved, but the
plan did not require the entire base to close.

The

Commission on Base Realignment and Closure gave the Air
Force the option of keeping the Aerospace Audiovisual
Service at Norton Air Force Base or moving it to March
Air Force Base in Riverside, California.

The Air Force

chose to move the facility to Riverside.

The

Commission on Base Realignment and Closure also told
the Air Force that the Ballistic Missile Office in
Norton would be maintained at Norton, and 300 homes at
the Norton facility would be kept open for the missile
office workers and personnel of March Air Force

B a s e .

5

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE CLOSURE OF NORTON AIR FORCE BASE
The Defense Secretary's Commission On Base

^"Battle for land sparks base fears, emotions,"
San Bernadino S u n , 3 June 1990, (Newsbank Index, p. INT
63: Bl).
5"EPA ties toxics cleanup to development at
Norton," San Bernadino Sun, 9 March 1989, (Newsbank
Index, p. INT 27: A9).
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Realignment and Closure had four justifications for
their desire to close Norton Air Force base.

One of

the reasons was the fact that flight operations at
Norton were constrained by an increase in air traffic
in the Los Angeles area.

Another reason for closing

the base was the fact that the warehouses were
deteriorating and most other facilities on the base
needed to be upgraded to meet current standards of
technology.

A third reason was the fact that the

quality of life at the base was inferior.

The base has

a shortage of family housing units and inadequate
medical, dental, and recreational facilities.

Finally,

the base was closed because the United States
government had a surplus of capacity in the category of
strategic-airlift installation.6

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE CLOSURE OF NORTON AIR FORCE
BASE O N THE SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES A N D THE INLAND EMPIRE
The actual degree of economic damage that the
closing of Norton Air Force Base will have on the local
community is difficult to ascertain.

According to

Mayor Evelyn Wilcox of San Bernadino the base closure
would have a profound effect on San Bernadino, and the

^The Defense Secretary's Commission On Base
Realignment and Closure.
Report of the Defense
Secretary's Commission (Washington D.C.:
1988), p. 77.
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closure would remove $248 million from the community
when it withdrew its annual payroll.

It is certainly

true that the closing of the base would mean the ending
of 6,600 jobs in the area, but an additional 1,300 jobs
at the base would be kept because the nearby Air Force
Ballistic Missile base was not affected by the military
cutbacks.

In fact, the lose of jobs in the area may be

more of an illusion than anyone realizes.

Colonel

Brooke P. Bailey pointed out at a press conference
that,

"'the vast majority1 of those losing their jobs

would get new ones at other bases, in many cases at
nearby March Air Force Base in

R i v e r s i d e .

Lieutenant Colonel Lynn Nelson tended to agree
with Bailey's assessment of the economic impact of the
base closure.

He pointed out the fact that the total

number of jobs scheduled to move ten miles south to
March Air Force Base was 2,800.

He also pointed out

that the short term impact of the base closure would be
minimal with an overall positive effect for the
community in the long term.

Nelson said the reason for

the minimal short term impact on the region was
because,

"We have 3,500 civilians here, but it's going

to be two or three years down the road before anyone

^"Presidio Among 6 in California on Target
List," Los Angeles Times, 30 December 1988, (Newsbank
Index, p. INT 165:
D6).
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starts losing jobs."®
Another factor which may reduce the overall impact
of the facilities closure on the economy of the area is
that the base will become one of the biggest chunks of
real estate open to development in the Southern
California area.

In addition, the property is located

in a part of town where the cost of real estate is much
less expensive.

The end result of inexpensive and

available land has sparked a tremendous amount of
interest in purchasing the land, and it is likely to be
developed by local authorities and private companies
because the Pentagon is discouraging federal
development.9
The land value of Norton Air Force Base alone was
estimated at $200 million in 1990.

Additional assets

of the property include 200 buildings, and 1,500 acres
of hangars and runways.

The Air Force facilities are

large enough to handle 747 jets.10

®"The Last Waltz at 86 Military Bases,"
Insight/Washington Times, 9 October 1989, (Newsbank
Index, p. INT 113:
Cll).
9 Ibid.
10"San Bernadino learns there's life after a
base closes," Austin American-Statesman, 4 February
1990, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 14: D5).
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THE IRON TRIANGLE OF NORTON AIR FORCE BASE: FIGHTING OVER A
F E W SCRAPS OF M E A T
As previously mentioned, the people affected by
the closing of Norton Air Force Base did relatively
little to prevent their base from being closed, and in
fact,the majority of the local iron triangle's
political activity was used to keep other facilities,
that were not a part of the closure, from being added
to the list.

For example, in November of 1989 the

United States Air Force considered the idea of finding
a legal loop hole to close the Ballistic Systems
Division in San Bernadino.

The loophole that the Air

Force wanted to create was necessary because the United
States Congress had recently passed a law specifically
stating that the Ballistics Systems Division was to
remain in San Bernadino.

Therefore, they decided to

reorganize the division under a different Air Force
unit, and move it to an Air Force unit at Vandenberg
Air Force Base near Lompoc.

The move would have been

perfectly legal even though it defied the spirit of the
law passed by Congress which stated that moving the
division would cost too much.11
Upon hearing about the political maneuvers of the

11"AF Trying to Move Unit in Defiance of Law,"
Los Angeles Times, 17 November 1989, (Newsbank Index,
p. INT 139:
F 7 ).
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Air Force the local iron triangle moved into full
action.

Rep. George E. Brown Jr.

(D - Colton) moved

his congressional aides into a full scale effort to
prevent the move.

Rep. Brown was especially opposed to

the closing of the Ballistic Systems Division because
it was set to occur at a time when the local economy
would be vulnerable to the problems caused by the
closing of Norton Air Force Base.

The Air Force has

begun to back away from its original position of moving
the division because of the protests of the
congressmen.

Rep. Brown has assured his constituents

that he would not back down from the fight, and in a
statement to the press he said,

"'I didn't like having

Norton closed to begin with, and I lost on that,... But
in losing that, we got a clear statement that BSD
remains.

Now it is the Air Force's turn to try to

change the law, not mine.'"12
Another incident which required the attention of
the local iron triangle was the problem of
environmental cleanups at the base.

According to Rep.

Jerry Lewis (R - Redlands) the Air Force told the
Commission on Base Realignment and Closure that some
waste sites at Norton would not be completely clean
until 1998.

The report to the Commission disturbed

12Ibid.

119
Rep. Lewis who feared that the Pentagon would place
more importance in purchasing new weapons than in
cleaning old bases.

He urged the Commission to keep

the focus of the Pentagon on cleaning the old bases.
Rep. Lewis was supported by Rep. Brown who requested an
increase in Defense Department funding for the cleanup
at Norton and other polluted bases around the
country.12
Rep. Brown also lobbied members of the House
Energy and Commerce Committee concerning the future
land-use of Norton Air Force Base.

The economic

development assistant to congressman Brown pointed out
that some aspects of the cleanup at Norton could take
ten or twenty years.

Therefore, Rep. Brown asked the

congressional committee to look into ways to allow
Norton's land to be redeveloped without preventing
efforts to protect the environment.^

THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF THE N O RTON AIR FORCE BASE
CLOSURE
The environmental cleanup of Norton Air Force Base

13"Norton cleanup accord," Riverside Press
Enterprise, 18 May 1989, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 52:
El).
^ " T o x i c s cloud Norton AFB redevelopment," Los
Angeles Business Journal, 19 August 1991, (Newsbank
Index, p. INT 139:
F2).
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is a particularly important issue for the people living
near the base because Norton Air Force Base is amongst
the 1,000 sites across the country listed as part of
the Superfund list.

Julie Andrews was the chief of the

Environmental Protection Agency's Federal Enforcement
Section in March of 1989 when the people of Norton Air
Force Base were having difficulties with the cleanup of
the base.

Andrews complained that the officials at

Norton Air Force Base where moving too slowly towards
drafting cleanup plans for the base.

The people at the

Environmental Protection Agency felt the process was
going so slow that at one point in early 1989 they
considered getting the Department of Justice to sue the
Department of Defense in order to speed up cleanup
efforts.*5

Fortunately for all parties concerned, the

Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of
Defense came to an agreement in May of 1989 without
legal action.

The goal of the agreement between the

two agencies was to speed up the cleanup process, and
the agreement obligated the Air Force to search a wider
and deeper area for environmental contamination.

The

agreement also obligated the Air Force to check and
remove ruptured underground tanks and commit to

15 « e p a ties toxics cleanup to development at
Norton," San Bernadino S u n , 9 March 1989, (Newsbank
Index, p. INT 27: A9).
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specified deadlines for completing the cleanup.

Alexis

Strauss, the chief of the Superfund enforcement branch
for the Environmental Protection Agency, pointed out
that,

"'The biggest change is that what they have been

doing in the past has been at their own direction.
What will happen at the base from now on will be driven
by EPA and the state.'"10
The estimated cost of cleanup at Norton Air Force
Base was $44.8 million, and an additional $4 million is
expected to be used to monitor the area for twenty
years to insure that no environmental pollutants
remain.

More than half of the money will be spent to

cleanup a single dump located in the northeastern corner
of the facility.

The dump operated for 22 years from

1958 to 1980, and it received large quantities of
general refuse and smaller quantities of industrial
waste like:trichloroethylene, carbon tetrachloride,
refrigerant, acids, paint strippers, paint thinners,
and waste oils.

All these chemicals were placed in

large trenches which were twenty to fourty feet deep.17
The dump in the northeastern portion of the bases'

i6"Norton cleanup accord," Riverside Press
Enterprise, 18 May 1989, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 52:
D 1 4 ).
17"Cost of Norton toxic cleanup pegged at $44.8
million, documents show," San Bernadino S u n , 8 May
1989, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 52:
E2).
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property is a major concern for the redevelopment plans
of Norton, but it is not the only concern.

For

example, the Air Force is going to dig up property near
the 11th tee of their golf course because it was once
used as a radioactive waste burial site.

Materials

placed underground were used for painting radioactive
radium on dials used by the Air Force.

Another problem

is a waste drum storage site which has been used since
1961 to store hazardous waste temporarily until it
could be shipped to a permanent facility.

The storage

drums may have leaked over the last two decades.
Finally, the base has a problem with twelve old
industrial wastewater treatment p l ants.

The beds have

high concentrations of lead which in some cases are
within 500 feet of municipal wells outside the bases'
property.10
The Air Force has a great deal of cleanup work to
do, but they are not concerned about the local
communities'

inability to redevelop the facility and

integrate it into the local economy.

According to Gary

Vest, the Air Force deputy assistant secretary for
environment, safety, and occupational health, the
majority of the base can be transferred to the
community even if the cleanup is not completed before

18Ibid.
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the base closes.

The reason is because most of the

toxic waste contamination is located in the
northwestern section of the base.

In this section of

the base the ground water contains dangerous levels of
petroleum wastes and solvents.19
A more difficult problem concerning the local
communities surrounding Norton Air Force Base is the
effect of military pollutants on municipal water
reserves.

The municipal wells that provide the city of

Riverside with its water supply are currently being
threatened by an underground plume of pollutants from
the base.

The plume is moving through the water table

at a rate of six inches a day below the base property,
and some people feel it may be moving even more quickly
in areas outside the base property.

Almost 75% of

Riverside's water is provided by twenty wells which are
located within a mile of the property, and at least two
of them currently demonstrate levels of contamination.
The Air Force has agreed to reimburse the city for
contaminated water supplies, and they have started the
process of digging wells near toxic hot spots.

The

goal of these newly constructed wells is to extract
polluted water, cleanse it, and replace it in the water

19"Norton cleanup accord," Riverside Press
Enterprise, 18 May 1989, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 52:
D 1 4 ).
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table.20

MURPHY'S L A W A N D THE REDEVELOPMENT OF NORTON AIR FORCE
BASE
The Norton base closure started off better than
any of the other base closures previously examined.
The community realized the lack of control they had
over the future fate of their base, and they opted to
put all of their efforts into redevelopment of the
property.

Therefore, the communities did not have to

go through the wasted money, time, and effort that
Monterey and Long Beach endured when they vainly
attempted to preserve the existence of their bases.
Therefore,

it would be safe to assume that the

community had a smooth transition from military
facility to private real estate, but Norton's
transition was plagued by more problems than any of the
other case studies experienced.

The primary reason for

these problems sprouted from a lack of unity in the
community concerning the redevelopment of Norton.
Initially, the communities did not suffer from a
lack of unity when they came together to form a
redevelopment committee for Norton Air Force Base.

The

20"wells drilled in pollution probe," Riverside
Press Enterprise, 1 July 1992, (Newsbank Index p. INT
83: Cl).

end result of their labors was the Inland Valley
Development Agency which was comprised of city, county,
state, and federal authorities.21

The Inland Valley

Development Agency also had a great deal of good luck
in their first attempts to lure clients to the base
property.

In January of 1990 the Lockheed corporation

requested permission to utilize some of the old
facilities at Norton for a commercial aircraft
maintenance center.

The maintenance facility was

expected to employ as many as 970 workers by the year
1994, and the Lockheed corporation's marketing study
projected highly positive business opportunities for
the center into the year 2000.

According to the study,

Lockheed projected that commercial airlines would
contract out $900 million dollars worth of repair and
maintenace work for its fleets of Boeing 747 passenger
jets.

H.T. Bowling, the president of Lockheed Aircraft

Service Company in Ontario, pointed out that the four
old hangar bays at Norton were well suited to 7 4 7 's and
would save the company $20 million in new
construction.22

21 "San Bernadino learns there's life after a
base closes," Austin American Enterprise, 4 February
1990, (Newsbank Index p. INT 14: D5).
22 "Lockheed Proposes to Convert Norton Base to
Civilian Use," Los Angeles Times, 9 January 1990, p.
Dl.
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Overall, the project appeared to be perfectly
suited to the base, and it would seem difficult to
imagine any opposition to the plan.

However, mayor Bob

Holcomb of San Bernadino delayed the development of the
proposal because he felt he had not been adequately
familiarized with the plan.

His delay did not kill the

project, but the delay of future negotiations cost
Lockheed $50 million in lost contracts and it cost the
San Bernadino economy $1.8 million per month in local
payroll.23
Mayor Holcomb's actions complicated the Lockheed
project and cost the company a considerable amount of
money, but it was not the end of the problems that
Lockheed would have while doing business in the San
Bernadino area.

By September of 1991 the company

received approval to use the hangars, but they needed
to replace the floors in the hangars before they could
begin operations at the facilities.

Lockheed removed

the floors and discovered the soil underneath the
hangars was contaminated with various toxic chemicals.
The discovery of the pollutants brought a series of
state and federal orders to stop progress on the
project until the contaminates were removed.

The

23"Battle for land sparks base fears,
emotions," San Bernadino S u n , 3 June 1990, (Newsbank
Index, p. INT 63:
All).
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discovery of contaminants at the hangars added nine
months and $1 million to the cost of opening the
facility to commercial

u s e .

24

The opposition of Mayor Holcomb and unknown
environmental pollutants at the base could have meant
the end to Lockheed's bid to redevelop a portion of
Norton Air Force Base.

Fortunately, one community

leader's opposition to a project was not enough to
scare investors away, but it was not the only example
of disunity in the community.

In fact, the struggle to

control the redevelopment of Norton Air Force Base has
sparked five separate law suits, and it has helped San
Bernadino County earn the reputation of being home to
the most vicious base-reuse battle in the nation.
Apparently, the lack of local unity demonstrated in the
Lockheed project is a chronic problem of the San
Bernadino area.

William Leonard Sr., a state

Republican Party chief, pointed out the problem when he
lamented that,

"'It's unfortunate, but our political

leaders have a tendency to be very parochial... I think
the biggest problem is the mistrust between individuals

24"ciosing up bases a messy business,"
Sacramento B e e , 1 September 1991, (Newsbank Index, p.
INT 139:
Ell).
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at the local level.1"25
The law suits were started by the communities of
San Bernadino, Redlands, and Highland.

All three

communities have an interest in how Norton Air Force
Base is developed because Norton Air Force Base is
located in San Bernadino and is surrounded by the
communities of Highland and Redlands.

These three

communities filed their law suits over disputes
concerning how much land and money each community would
have to contribute to the development of Norton Air
Force Base and how much profit each community would
receive from the redevelopment project.

For example,

the city of Highland complained that it would have to
give away half of its extra property tax on
approximately 88% of its land in order to join the
Inland Valley Development Agency.

The city of Redlands

also complained that being a part of the bases'
redevelopment process would be too costly.

Swen

Larson, a Redlands City Councilman, complained about
proposals to turn over real estate located near
Interstate 10 in Redlands.

Larson pointed out that,

"'That's some of the prime real estate in the Inland
Empire,... I am very reluctant to see it diluted into a

2 5 "Battle for land sparks base fears,
emotions," San Bernadino S u n , 3 June 1990, (Newsbank
Index, p. INT 63: All).
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tax-sharing arrangement with that agency.'"26
However, Highland and Redlands are not the only
cities complaining about the greedy demands of other
cities in the area.

The city of San Bernadino is

expected to collect millions of dollars from sales and
utility taxes when the base moves out of federal hands.
The city of San Bernadino has never been allowed to
collect taxes on Norton Air Force Base in the past, and
both Highland and Redlands feel that the city
government of San Bernadino should share the Norton tax
base with other communities in the surrounding area.
Mayor Holcomb feels that the city of San Bernadino is
entitled to all of the taxes generated within their
city's borders since they will have to pay for all the
city services provided to the Norton Air Force Base
area like police and fire s e r v i c e s . 27
Another redevelopment fiasco occurred in December
of 1990 although local community tensions were not
responsible for its occurrence.

A Los Angeles

developer by the name of Iddo Benzeevi proposed a
master plan for the development of Norton Air Force
Base.

The master plan included the building of a high

26ifc>id., (Newsbank Index,

p. INT 63:

27 "Agencies reach stalemate in reuse
negotiations," San Bernadino S u n , 4 June 1990,
(Newsbank Index, p. INT 63:
Bll).

A13).

130
technology research facility and a sports center.

It

also included an amusement park which was to be
designed by the movie mogul George

L u c a s .

28

The

project was ambitious and required a great deal of
financial backing which became its downfall.

The

project was troubled by developers who backed away from
financing the project, and by June of 1991 Benzeevi
lost his exclusive right to develop the

a r e a .

29

By 1992 the local communities had succeeded in
developing the bases' hangars, but their attempt at a
master plan for the base had failed.

However, the

local communities were still willing to develop a
second master plan for the area which was started in
1993.

By September 9, 1993 the San Bernadino area had

succeeded in convincing the Air Force Base Disposal
Agency to lease the base to local authorities so that
it could be developed into a commercial mixed use
airport.

Finally, the communities of the Inland Empire

had come to an agreement as to how the base should be
developed, but the communities neglected to take into
consideration the desires of certain community

2 8 "Diverse Uses for Norton Air Base Planned
When It Closes," Los Angeles Times, 13 December 1990,
p. A3.
29"Toxics cloud Norton AFB redevelopment," Los
Angeles Business Journal, 19 August 1991, (Newsbank
Index, p. INT 139:
FI).
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organizations.

One such organization was the Western

Eagle Foundation which provides food for approximately
100,000 homeless people in the San Bernadino and
Riverside areas.

Western Eagle requested that the

entire base and its 10,000 foot runway be given to the
organization so that it could develop a job training
center and a base of operations for conducting
worldwide humanitarian flights.

Normally, the

community organization would have been overlooked
because it had not petitioned the Air Force first.
However, federal laws gave priority to local homeless
charities which petitioned the government for ownership
of base facilities.

Therefore, the San Bernadino

International Airport Authority was denied a long term
lease on the land until Western Eagle's request could
be considered.30
The local communities failed to consider the needs
of Western Eagle, and they would have had great
difficulty protecting their dreams of developing a
commercial airport if Western Eagle's fiscal integrity
had not been questioned.

According to the Riverside

Press Enterprise the base could cost up to $300 million
to renovate over the next twenty years.

The cost was

high, but Western Eagle claimed that it had enough

30"Rival Request Clouds Conversion of Air
Base," Los Angeles Times, 9 September 1993, p. A3.
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backers to make a serious bid for the base.

Western

Eagle's backers included a Russian development group
and a lawyer from Utah who promoted food supplements
that allegedly cured cancer.

The Department of Health

and Human Services was understandably curious about the
backgrounds of Western Eagle's financial backers and
requested more information.

Along with the mysterious

background of the financial backers of Western Eagle
there were other questions surrounding the charity
organization.

For example, why did none of the other

well established local charities in the area have any
knowledge of Western Eagle's operations in the Inland
Empire?

Why was Western Eagle reluctant to release a

list of the organization's directors when it applied to
join Survive Food Bank?

Finally, when Western Eagle

applied for usage of Norton Air Force Base, why were
three homeless people listed as three of the directors
in charge of Western Eagle's operations?^1
In the end, the federal Department of Health and
Human Services determined that Western Eagle had not
demonstrated the financial ability and experience to
accomplish its goals.

Therefore, the Department of

Health and Human Services only awarded the organization

31"Mystery jolts Norton AFB," Riverside Press
Enterprise, 3 October 1993, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 70:
Cl).
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five warehouses on the base for food banks.

The rest

of the base property in dispute was given to the local
community for development into a commercial

a i r p o r t .

32

ANALYSIS OF THE N O R T O N AIR FORCE CASE STUDY
In reviewing this case study it is necessary to
discuss how successful the process was behind the
closing of Norton Air Force Base?

The Norton Air Force

Base closure was done quite successfully by comparison
to both of the previous case studies reviewed in
chapters three and four.

One reason why this

particular base closure was so much more successful
than the others was because the local iron triangle of
San Bernadino had a stronger respect for the base
closure commission's power than the iron triangles of
Monterey and Long Beach.

The people of San Bernadino

understood that they had little chance to save their
base, and they did not choose to challenge the
Commission.

Ironically, the Commission was arguably

less powerful in 1988 than in the future rounds because
its legitimacy was not originally based upon
legislation in the 1988 round of base closures.
The base closure was also successful because

32"pians for Civilian Airport at Norton AFB
Kept Alive," Los Angeles Times, 23 November 1993, p.
A3.
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politics played virtually no role in the decision
making process of closing Norton Air Force Base.

The

decision to close Norton was based upon the fact that
Norton was an outdated facility in a category of Air
Force bases that had a surplus.

Norton's closure was a

natural choice.
The review of the Norton Air Force Base case study
also needs to consider whether or not there were any
unusual or unique patterns of political behavior
displayed in their case.

In this case, there is very

little evidence that can be compared with that of the
Fort Ord and the Long Beach case studies.

The local

iron triangle of San Bernadino never truly attempted to
engage in a political fight against the Commission.
Instead it opted to invest all its efforts into
redevelopment of the property.

The economic

redevelopment of Norton Air Force Base is probably the
single most unique aspect of this case study because it
illustrated what many people feared would happen in the
economic redevelopment of Fort Ord.

Fortunately, the

Monterey Peninsula did not suffer from such a high level
of disunity, but the potential for disagreement still
exists.

They would be wise to observe the political

and economic problems of the Inland Empire.
Certainly, the news from San Bernadino is not all
bad, and in fact, many good things have come from the
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closure of Norton.

For example, the redevelopment of

the base was successful.

Redevelopment still has many

obstacles to overcome like environmental pollution and
the lose of military jobs, but the community has gained
a modern airport facility which will produce more jobs
and benefits than the former base ever could have
produced.

In addition to the community receiving

benefits, the United States government saved money by
closing the facility.
Overall, the closure will be viewed as a success
in the future, but in the short term it has caused a
considerable amount of damage to the political
relationships of the area's local city governments.
It has also hurt relations between city governments and
corporations like Lockheed who were subjected to petty
political squabbles that cost them a considerable
amount of money.

In some cases, the base closure may

have even hurt relationships between city government
and community charity organizations who felt they may
have been overlooked in the redevelopment of Norton Air
Force Base.

CONCLUSION

ARE THE ELITES. INTEREST GROUPS. OR A COMBINATION OF THE T W O
RESPONSIBLE FOR RECENT BASE CLOSURES IN THE UNITED STATES?
Chapters one and two pointed out that the
responsibilities for base closures were shared between
the Department of Defense and the Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission.

However, the case studies

of Fort Ord, Long Beach, and Norton point out the fact
that the local iron triangles also played a valuable
role in the process of base closures.

In each case

study it can not be debated that the unelected
bureaucrats of the Defense Department and the base
closure Commission had the final word concerning which
bases were to remain open and which bases were to
close, but once their judgements were made they no
longer participated in any valuable way concerning the
fate of the bases.

The future redevelopment plans for

the bases were determined by local iron triangles
because they had to live with the decisions made by the
Commission.
The decisions made by the local iron triangles
differed from the decisions made by the bureaucrats of
the Defense Department in the fact that local iron
136
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triangles considered the needs of local interest
groups.

The Commission and Defense Department based

their decisions primarily upon the needs of policy
makers in the United States government.

Therefore,

military base closure decisions in the 1980's & 1990's
were determined by the political elites, but the end
results of those decisions were influenced by local
interest groups.
Of course these were not the only groups
responsible for the base closures.

Both the President

and the Congress played roles in approving the base
closures, but their roles were only minor by comparison
to the other political elites and interest groups.
Their roles were minor because of the actions taken by
the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission and
the Department of Defense.

These two institutions

produced small lists of base closures which allowed a
majority of congressmen and the President to avoid
angry reactions from their constituents.

The lack of a

voter backlash to their actions allowed both the
President and the Congress to close the bases according
to the wishes of the Commission.
Certainly, the United States government can
consider the actions taken by the Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission a great success, but can the
United States government look back upon its decision to

close bases and claim that it was a wise decision?

It

has been pointed out before that closures are fiscally
wise because of the federal budget deficit of the
1980's and 1 990's, but it is arguable that the greatest
damage of these decisions will be felt in the local
communities.

The wisdom of the federal government's

decisions may be debatable in the localities, but
historically, communities have become economically
stronger because of base closures.

In fact, this has

been demonstrated in the case studies of Fort Ord and
Norton Air Force Base.

In these cases the building of

a University and an international airport will bring a
better economy to the area.

The Long Beach Naval

Complex's redevelopment may not be as successful as the
Fort Ord or Norton Air Force Base redevelopment, but
its success is difficult to ascertain since the future
of the complex has not yet been fully determined.

FUTURE RESEARCH CONCERNING THE POLITICS BEHIND BASE
CLOSURES: W H A T CAN BE D O N E TO IMPROVE A N D EXPAND UPON
W H A T IS ALREADY K N O W N ?
At least four tasks face future researchers of
this topic.

First of all, future researchers need to

analyze the roles of civilian and military personnel in
base closures.

It is possible that the reason why the

people of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard were so hostile
towards their base being closed is because of the fact
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that they were not military personnel.

Civilian

employees are more strongly tied to their municipality
than are military employees.

Future analysis of

hostile base closures during the 1980's and 1990's may
reveal that the majority of the opposition to the base
closures came from civilian employees.
A second task facing researchers of this topic is
the need to create more case studies of actual base
closures.

No scholarly work currently exists

concerning the base closures of Fort Ord, Norton Air
Force Base, and the Long Beach Naval Complex.

The only

material currently available concerning these bases can
be found in newspapers and magazines.

More case work

needs to be done before anyone can truly be able to
claim they have found patterns of political behavior in
the recent bout of base closures.
The third task facing researchers of this topic is
comparing the base closures of the 1 980's and 1990's
with previous base closures.

The contrasts and

comparisons between various periods of successful and
unsuccessful base closures may reveal new information
concerning how public policy works in the United
States.

However, this task will probably have to be

done after more case studies have been accumulated.
The final task facing researchers is a problem
facing not just people who are researching base
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closures but anyone who is doing public policy research
about the military.

The current information available

today concerning the military iron triangle rarely
discusses the influence of the iron triangle upon
military bases.

The main focus of books about the iron

triangle usually is the military industrial firm or the
political action committee of the military industrial
firm.

Authors are much less likely to discuss how the

iron triangle prevents a base from closing, and this
problem in the literature needs to change before the
iron triangle's role in base closures can be more fully
understood.

Therefore, researchers in the field of

military public policy ought to begin putting more
emphasis on how the iron triangle affects bureaucratic
decisions behind base closures.
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